Involuntary Outpatient Commitment for the Chronically Mentally Ill by Hinds, Jillane T.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 69 | Issue 2 Article 5
1990
Involuntary Outpatient Commitment for the
Chronically Mentally Ill
Jillane T. Hinds
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation




for the Chronically Mentally Ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction: The (Perceived) Need for Outpatient
Commitment .............................................. 346
II. Commitment to Outpatient Treatment .................... 355
A. Outpatient Commitment or Conditional Release? .... 355
1. Conditional Release ............................... 356
2. Outpatient Commitment .......................... 358
B. Outpatient Treatment ................................. 361
1. Treatment Planning ............................... 361
2. Review ............................................. 365
3. Right to Refuse Outpatient Treatment ............ 367
III. Enforcement: Revocation of Outpatient Commitment .... 376
A. Statutory Procedures ................................. 376
B. Constitutional Requirements .......................... 380
C. Analysis ............................................... 397
IV. Criteria for Involuntary Commitment ..................... 402
A. The Dangerousness Standard ......................... 402
B. A Lower Standard for Outpatient Commitment? . . . . .  404
V. Conclusion: Summary and Recommendations ............ 408
I. INTRODUCTION: THE (PERCEIVED) NEED FOR
OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT
To correct the "abuses" of the psychiatrist's discretionary power in confin-
ing and releasing mental hospital patients, the legislatures and the courts have
only two alternatives. One option is... to restrict the psychiatrist's powers to
confine and release by assuming or arrogating more of these powers them-
selves.... Another option is the abolition of psychiatric imprisonment and
the whole system of involuntary psychiatry. 1
Treatment for the chronically mentally ill has undergone marked
changes in the past two decades. Public awareness of abuse and ne-
glect of the mentally ill in large, isolated state and county institutions,
* B.A., University of Denver, 1982; J.D., University of Nebraska College of Law,
1988; M.A., University of Nebraska - Lincoln, 1989.
1. Szasz, Involuntary Psychiatry, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 347, 365 (1976).
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new antipsychotic medications, and increasing involvement of the
legal system in the care of the mentally disabled provided the impetus
for the policies of deinstitutionalization2 and community care3 as well
as constitutional 4 and statutory5 standards governing treatment and
confinement.
The deinstitutionalization movement operated on the assumption
that community care and freedom from the restrictiveness of total in-
stitutions are beneficial for the mentally 111.6 The goals of the deinsti-
tutionalization movement included the development of a continuum
of community-based services for the mentally disabled, including the
chronically mentally ill; minimal use of institutions; treatment in the
least restrictive settings;7 and preventive mental health care.8 Conse-
2. See, eg., Bachrach, An Overview of Deinstitutionalization, in DEInsTIUIoNAL-
IZATION (L. Bachrach ed. 1983).
3. See, eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 911/2, para. 1-119(2)(Smith-Hurd 1987)(gives prefer-
ence to care or treatment in the individual's home community).
4. E.g., clear and convincing standard of proof required in civil commitment pro-
ceedings (Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)); right to minimally adequate
treatment (Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
5. Approximately forty-two states provide for treatment of the mentally disabled in
the least restrictive setting, Weiner, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in THE
MENTALLY DisABLED AND THE LAw 297 (Brakel, Parry & Wiener ed. 3d ed. 1985),
twenty-five states require proof of dangerousness as well as mental illness for
involuntary commitment; Brakel, INVOLUNTARY INSTITUTIONALIZATION, in id. at
34; and in most other states dangerousness is an alternative ground of
commitment.
6. But see Minkoff, Beyond Deinstitutionalization. A New Ideology for the Postin-
stitutional Era, 38 Hosp. & COMMUNrrY PsYCHIATRY 945, 946-47 (1987)(TFreedom
of choice and community living have often not made the lives of chronic patients
better and easier. Given a choice, patients do not readily choose the identity of
'chronic mental patient' and thus have enormous difficulties making use of our
programs to get the help they so desperately need").
7. The doctrine of the least restrictive alternative, or least restrictive environment
or setting, refers to "the objective of maintaining the greatest degree of freedom,
self-determination, autonomy, dignity, and integrity of body, mind, and spirit for
the individual while he or she participates in treatment or receives services."
THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, 1 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COMIssIoN ON MENTAL HEALTH 44 (1978). The concept
of a least restrictive alternative has been applied to legal status, In re Farrow, 41
N.C. App. 680, 255 S.E.2d 777 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)(voluntary admission less re-
strictive than involuntary commitment); type of treatment, Rogers v. Okin, 634
F.2d 650, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1980)(balancing of competing interests in determining
whether patient should be forcibly medicated "demands an individualized esti-
mation of the possibility and type of violence, the likely effects of particular drugs
on a particular individual, and an appraisal of alternative, less restrictive courses
of action;" reasonable alternatives to the administration of antipsychotic drugs
must be ruled out); locus of treatment, Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir.
1966)(en banc); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972)(community programs less restrictive
than full-time institutionalization); and treatment settings within a hospital, Cov-
ington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969)(maximum security ward most re-
strictive). However, a treatment program must also be appropriate for each
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quently, inpatient populations of public mental hospitals decreased, as
did patients' mean length of stay.9 General and private psychiatric
hospitals have been increasingly utilized to treat the mentally ill.10
Although there is some support for the belief that many seriously
mentally ill patients can be successfully treated in the community
with adequate treatment and support,1 1 the goals of deinstitutionaliza-
patient's needs. See Bachrach, Is the Least Restrictive Environment Always the
Best? Sociological and Semantic Implications, 31 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIA-
TRY 97,100 (1980) (restrictiveness is associated with environmental factors, includ-
ing location, staffing, programs and treatment provided, and degree of autonomy,
which are not necessarily related to whether the patient lives independently in
his own home, a halfway house, a hospital, or some other class of residential facil-
ity); Gutheil, Appelbaum & Wexler, The Inappropriateness of "Least Restrictive
Alternative" Analysis for Involuntary Procedures with the Institutionalized
Mentally 111, 11 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 7 (1983); Ransohoff, Zachary, Gaynor & Har-
greaves, Measuring Restrictiveness of Psychiatric Care, 33 Hosp. & CoMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 361 (1982).
8. See, e.g., Mental Health Systems Act, Pub. L. No. 96-398, 94 Stat. 1564, 1601 &
1604 (1980), repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-35, § 902, 95 Stat. 357, 560 (1981); G. CAPLAN, PRINCIPLES OF PREVENTIVE PSY-
CHIATRY 110 (1964). But see Bachrach, supra note 2, at 98 ("Widespread belief in
the goals of deinstitutionalization has frequently covered up an absence of
consensus.").
9. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, TOWARD A NATIONAL PLAN FOR
THE CHRONICALLY MENTALLY IL, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY BY THE DEPART-
MENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES STEERING CommrrrEE ON THE CHRONI-
CALLY MENTALLY ILL (1980) [hereinafter Health and Human Services Report]
(number of residents in public mental hospitals was 559,000 in 1955; 504,000 in
1963; 216,000 in 1974; and 150,000 in 1980); De Risi & Vega, The Impact of Deinsti-
tutionalization on California's State Hospital Population, 34 Hosp. & COMMU-
NITY PSYCHIATRY 140 (1983); Goldman, Adams & Taube, Deinstitutionalization:
The Data Demythologized, 34 Hosp. & CoMmUNITY PSYCHIATRY 129, 131 table 1
(1983) (public hospital resident population decreased from 558,922 patients in 1955
to 137,810 in 1980) and 134 (chronic mental patients continue to use inpatient psy-
chiatric resources but length of stay has decreased and use of ambulatory services
has increased); Klerman, National Trends in Hospitalization, 30 HOsP. & COM-
MUNITY PSYCHIATRY 110 (1979).
10. C. TAUBE & R. REDICK, DIVISION OF BIOMETRY AND EPIDEmIOLOGY, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, PROVISIONAL DATA ON PATIENT CARE EPISODES
IN MENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES 1975 (Statistical Note 139 Aug. 1977)(proportion
of inpatient and outpatient care episodes at state and county hospitals compared
to private mental hospitals, general hospital psychiatric services, V.A. psychiatric
inpatient services, and CMHC's reduced from 49% of total episodes in 1955 to 9%
in 1975); Goldman, Adams & Taube, supra note 9; Kiesler & Sibulkin, People,
Clinical Episodes, and Mental Hospitalization: A Multiple-Source Method of Es-
timation, in 2 ADVANCES IN APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (R. Kidd & M. Saks ed.
1983).
11. See HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-4 (study sponsored
by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Mental Health showed
that between 50% and 75% of admissions to the state's mental hospitals could be
avoided if adequate community services were available) and at 2-5 (as many as
two-thirds of patients currently residing in inpatient settings could be more ap-
propriately treated in other, less protective settings); B. PASAMANICM, F.
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tion have not been fully realized.' 2 Because chronic individuals often
remain underserved,13 many mentally ill former patients have become
homeless or neglected in the community.14 Others have been "trans-
institutionalized"'5 into nursing homes, prisons, and jails. 16
These problems have led to increasing public pressure-particu-
SCARPrrni & S. DNm, SCHIZOPHRENICS IN THE Comanry: AN EXPERIMENTAL
STUDY IN THE PREVENTION OF HOSPITALIZATION ix (1957)(experimental study
confirmed hypothesis that 'home care for schizophrenic patients is feasible, that
the combination of drug therapy and public health nurses' home visitations is
effective in preventing hospitalization, and that home care is at least as good a
method of treatment as hospitalization by any or all criteria, and probably supe-
rior by most")(emphasis in original); ALTERNATIVES TO MENTAL HOSPITAL
TREATMENT (L. Stein & M. Test eds. 1978); Becker & Schulberg, Phasing Out
State Hospital-A Psychiatric Dilemma, 294 NEW ENG. J. MED. 255 (1976); Cohen,
Sichel & Berger, The Use of a Mid-Manhattan Hotel as a Support System, 13 COM-
MUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 76 (1977); Dittmar & Franklin, State Hospital Pa-
tients Discharged to Nursing Homes: How Are They Doing?, 31 HOsp. &
COMMUNTY PSYCHIATRY 255 (1980); Geller, Rights, Wrongs, and the Dilemma of
Coerced Community Treatment, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1259 (1986); Kiesler,
Mental Hospitals and Alternative Care: Noninstitutionalization as Potential
Public Policy for Mental Patients, 37 A. PSYCHOLOGIST 349 (1982); Lamb &
Goertzel, The Long-Term Patient in the Era of Community Treatment, 34
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 679 (1977); Langsley, Machotka & Flomenhaft,
Avoiding Mental Hospital Admission: A Follow-Up Study, 127 AM. J. PSYCHA-
TRY 1391, 1394 (1971); Mosher, Menn & Matthews, Soteria: Evaluation of Home-
Based Treatment for Schizophrenia, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 455 (1975); Po-
lak & Kirby, A Model to Replace Psychiatric Hospitals, 162 J. NERVOUS &
MENTAL DISEASE 13 (1976); Stein, Test & Marx, Alternative to the HospitaL A
Controlled Study, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 517 (1975).
12. See Bachrach, Evaluating the Consequences of Deinstitutionalization, 34 Hosp. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 105 (1983); Slovenko, The Past and Present of the Right
to Treatment; A Slogan Gone Astray, 9 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 263, 272 (1981)("the
mental hospital provides more of a community, especially for the disabled, than
do our urban areas") and at 275 ("patients are not receiving the appropriate care
or treatment in the inpatient or outpatient community alternatives"); Talbott,
Deinstitutionalization: Avoiding the Disasters of the Past, 30 HosP. & COMMu-
NITY PSYCHIATRY 621 (1979).
13. Goldman, Adams & Taube, supra note 9; Bachrach, A Conceptual Approach to
Deinstitutionalization, 29 Hosp. & CommNnrY PSYCHIATRY 573 (1978).
14. Chase, Where Have All the Patients Gone?, 2 HUMAN BEHAV. 10 (1973); Lamb,
Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless Mentally ill, 35 Hosp. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 899 (1984); Talbott, supra note 12.
15. Warren, New Forms of Social ControL The Myth of Deinstitutionalization, 8 AM.
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 724 (1981); Talbott, supra note 12.
16. See I. KEILrZ, INSTITUTE ON MENTAL DIsABRm"y AND THE LAW, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, A SUPPLEMENT TO THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS GUIDELINES FOR INVOLUNTARY CrVIL COMMITMENT FOR FAMILIES AND
FAMILY SELF-HELP ORGANIZATIONS (1987) [hereinafter IMDL SUPPLEMENT]; Ab-
ramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior:. Possible Side Ef-
fects of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HOsp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 101
(1972); Slovenko & Luby, On the Emancipation of Mental Patients, 3 J. PSYCHIA-
TRY & L. 191 (1975); Stelovich, From the Hospital to the Prison: A Step Forward
in Deinstitutionalization?, 30 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 618 (1979); Whit-
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larly by family alliance groups for the mentally il117-to relax commit-
ment criteria so that involuntary treatment can be provided to more
mentally ill individuals than are currently served.1 8 Two legislative
bills introduced in the 1989 legislative session propose to broaden the
group of candidates for involuntary commitment in Nebraska by mak-
ing it easier to commit persons who are "likely to suffer substantial
mental or physical deterioration" as the result of a "severe
disorder."19
Some commentators have blamed the shift from a medical model
of treatment to a legal model20 (which has strict commitment criteria
and emphasizes patient rights) for the "denial" of treatment for men-
tally ill persons who are "obviously" in need of treatment. 21 Descrip-
mer, From Hospitals to Jails: The Fate of California's Deinstitutionalized Men-
tally Ill, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPsYCHIATRY 65 (1980).
17. See IMDL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16; Treffert, The Obviously Ill Patient in
Need of Treatment- A Fourth Standard for Civil Commitment, 36 Hosp. & COM-
muNrry PSYCHIATRY 259, 261 (1985).
18. Treffert, supra note 17.
19. See L.B. 374, 91st Leg. Sess. (1989) and L.B. 732, 91st Leg. Sess. (1989). "Likely to
suffer substantial mental or physical deterioration" is defined in both bills to
mean:
[A]s evidenced by recent behavior, the person will, if not treated, suffer
or continue to suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical
distress, and such distress is associated with significant impairment of
judgment, reason, or behavior, causing a substantial deterioration of his
or her previous ability to function on his or her own.
"Severe mental disorder" means "an illness, disease, organic brain disorder, or
other condition which (i) substantially impairs the person's thought, perception
of reality, emotional process, or judgment or (ii) substantially impairs behavior as
manifested by recent disturbed behavior." L.B. 374, § 1(2)(d), 91st Leg., 1st Sess.
(1989) and L.B. 732, 91st Leg., 1st Sess. (1989).
20. See generally Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54 (1982). In
general, medical models confer broad authority on mental health professionals
under state parens patriae powers to hospitalize mentally ill persons deemed "in
need of treatment." Legal models emphasize safeguards to protect patients'
rights and limit coercive intervention and favor use of state police powers. See
also Gutheil & Mills, Legal Conceptualizations, Legal Fictions, and the Manipu-
lation of Reality: Conflict between Models of Decision Making in Psychiatry and
Law, 10 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 17 (1982).
21. Treffert, supra note 17; IMDL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16. But see Faulkner,
Bloom & Kundahl-Stanley, Effects of a New Involuntary Commitment Law: Ex-
pectations and Reality, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 249 (1982)(con-
cerns of mental health professionals that new Arkansas law emphasizing due
process and patients' rights would prevent admissions to the state hospital, divert
patients into the criminal justice system, force early release and cause revolving-
door readmissions were not borne out); Haupt & Ehrlich, The Impact of a New
State Commitment Law on Psychiatric Patient Careers, 31 Hosp. & ComMUNrrY
PSYCHIATRY 745, 749 (1980). Pennsylvania's new commitment act "was expected
to cause greater problems in committing a patient to inpatient care on an involun-
tary basis, [but] the study does not reflect this outcome." A small but significant
increase in involuntary admissions and in length of stay was attributed to a
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tions of "revolving door" patients who fail to seek or continue
outpatient treatment 22 upon discharge from inpatient hospitalization
have become common.23 Without treatment, these individuals deteri-
orate in the community until they once again meet the commitment
criteria24 and are rehospitalized.
Continuity of care is essential in planning treatment programs for
the chronically mentally ill.25 The goals of brief hospital treatment
are typically limited to controlling clinical symptoms and planning
continued aftercare treatment.26 In general, the use of outpatient psy-
chiatric services has been associated with fewer readmissions and im-
proved functioning.27 Outpatient treatment compliance has also been
found to be an important predictor of length of inpatient stays for pa-
greater frequency of admissions of patients who had been discharged against
medical advice. The authors cite a study by the Philadelphia County Office of
Mental Health and Mental Retardation which indicated the law had facilitated
involuntary intervention, id. at 750, but following the change in the law, the pro-
portion of discharges against medical advice increased, length of stay shortened,
and recidivism rates were higher.
22. "Outpatient treatment" generally means any treatment program which does not
require continuous inpatient hospitalization. See, ag., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-501(25)(1986 & Supp. 1989).
23. See, e.g., Bursten, Posthospital Mandatory Outpatient Treatment, 143 AM. J. PSY-
CEHITRY 1255 (1986); Cohen, Sichel & Berger, supra note 11; Hiday & Scheid-
Cook, The North Carolina Eaperience with Outpatient Commitment" A Critical
Appraisal, 10 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHATRY 215 (1987); IMDL SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 16; Miller & Fiddleman, Outpatient Commitment Treatment in the Least
Restrictive Environment?, 35 HosP. & CoMmuNrrY PSYCHIATRY 147 (1984); Tref-
fert, supra note 17.
24. Many states require that mentally ill persons meet the criteria of danger to self,
danger to others, or gravely disabled in order to be subject to involuntary civil
commitment. E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1009 (1987).
25. Bachrach, Continuity of Care for Chronic Mental Patients: A Conceptual Analy-
sis, 138 Am. J. PSYCHATRY 1449 (1981). See Caton, Koh, Fleiss, Barrow & Gold-
stein, Rehospitalization in Chronic Schizophrenia, 173 J. NERvous & MENTAL
DISEASE 139, 145 (1985)("Failure to link the patient successfully to necessary
community services can result in a rehospitalization very shortly after
discharge.").
26. Caton & Gralnick, A Review of Issues Surrounding Length of Psychiatric Hospi-
talization, 38 HosP. & COmmuNITY PSYCHIATRY 858, 859 (1987); Stromberg &
Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally 171, 20 HARv. J.
ON LEG s. 275, 284 (1983)("Modern psychiatric treatment at its best is geared to
intensive short-term therapy, not to long-term hospital care.").
27. Caton, Koh, Fleiss, Barrow & Goldstein, supra note 25, at 144 (compliance with
community treatment, interpersonal stress, and the adequacy of social supports
were predictors of survivorship in the community; number of rehospitalization
episodes was determined largely by the adequacy of discharge planning for after-
care treatment); Hafner & an der Heiden, Effectiveness and Cost of Community
Care for Schizophrenic Patients, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 59 (1989).
See also Goldstein & Horgan, Inpatient and Outpatient Psychiatric Services:
Substitutes or Complements?, 39 Hosp. & CommuNrrY PsYcIATRY 632 (1988).
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tients who were readmitted.28
However, many previously hospitalized patients are unwilling to
seek outpatient treatment voluntarily,29 and the dropout rate for out-
patient treatment is high.30 Given the importance of aftercare serv-
ices in maintaining the chronically mentally ill in the community, it is
not surprising that hospital readmission rates are also high.31 Because
the presence of psychiatric symptoms may limit the ability of the men-
tally ill to use aftercare services,3 2 involuntary outpatient civil com-
mitment is increasingly recommended for compelling treatment for
those chronically mentally ill individuals-who have a history of fail-
ing to continue taking antipsychotic medication voluntarily or consist-
ently and who, without medication, would predictably require
inpatient hospitalization again in the future.33
Proponents of outpatient commitment emphasize the potential for
more effective treatment through addressing the individual's needs in
coping with community life.34 Some commentators argue that the cur-
rent reactive, crisis-oriented approach is inappropriate in caring for
the chronically mentally ill.35 Outpatient treatment-so the theory
goes--allows therapists to monitor clients' conditions and respond to
changes which could precipitate deterioration.3 6 Continuing outpa-
28. Caton, Koh, Fleiss, Barrow & Goldstein, supra note 25, at 145.
29. See Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 23.
30. See Pekarik, Coping with Dropouts, 16 PROF. PSYCHOLOGICAL RES. & PRAc. 114
(1985); Sue, McKinney & Allen, Predictors of the Duration of Terapy for Clients
in the Community Mental Health System, 12 COMMUI~TY MENTAL HEALTH J. 365
(1976)(of 13,450 clients seen in seventeen community mental health facilities,
over 40% terminated treatment after one session).
31. Durham & La Fond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of
Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, YALE L. & POL'Y REv.
101 (1985); Kiesler, supra note 11; Lewis & Hugi, Therapeutic Stations and the
Chronically Treated Mentally Ill, 55 SoCIAL SERVIcE REV. 206 (1981); Schwartz &
Goldfinger, The New Chronic Patient: Clinical Characteristics of an Emerging
Subgroup, 32 Hosp. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 470 (1981); Talbott, Stopping the
Revolving Door: A Study of Readmissions to a State Hospital, 48 PSYCHIATRIC Q.
159 (1974)(sixty per cent of all admissions in three-month study were
readmissions).
32. Goering, Wasylenki, Lancee & Freeman, From Hospital to Community: Six
Month and Two-Year Outcomes for 505 Patients, 172 J. NERvous & MENTAL DIS-
EASE 667 (1984).
33. Bursten, supra note 23; Geller, supra note 11; Hiday and Scheid-Cook, supra note
23; Miller and Fiddleman, supra note 23.
34. See Mulvey, Geler & Roth, The Promise and Peril of Involuntary Outpatient
Commitment, 42 AM. PSYCHoLoGIST 571, 578 (1987), for discussion of the argu-
ments in favor of and opposing involuntary outpatient commitment.
35. See Caton & Gralnick, supra note 26, at 860 (brief hospitalization may be the
treatment of choice for nonchronic nonpsychotic patients); Geller, supra note 11,
at 1262; Mulvey, Geller & Roth, supra note 34.
36. See G. CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 105 ("The major defect of the present system in
most communities is that patients who are discharged from a mental hospital
leave its jurisdiction and cease to be objects of administrative concern. .. "
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tient treatment could thereby prevent or reduce the need for inpatient
hospitalization.3 7
However, coerced treatment calls into question the proper balance
among competing interests: the individual's interest in privacy, auton-
omy, and freedom from state intervention;38 the family's interest in
ensuring that a loved one receives needed treatment; and the state's
interest in protecting citizens from dangerous mentally ill persons (po-
lice power commitments) and in caring for citizens who are unable to
care for themselves (parens patria commitments).39 Questions about
the limited efficacy of available treatment--especially when coerced-
raise concerns that the infringement of liberty will accomplish only
social monitoring functions.40
Nebraska is among the states which permit involuntary commit-
ment to outpatient treatment but are "silent on the myriad issues"
involved.41 The lack of clear procedures and guidelines for outpatient
commitment often results in infrequent use42 or inappropriate use43of
Although Dr. Caplan suggested continuing responsibility of hospital staff, he rec-
ognized that any changes in commitment laws must "safeguard the privacy of the
citizen"); Goering, Wasylenki, Lancee & Freeman, supra note 32, at 672 ("Treat-
ment with psychotropic medication requires frequent monitoring over long peri-
ods of time by someone who is familiar with the patient").
37. See Bursten, supra note 23; Caton, Koh, Fleiss, Barrow & Goldstein, supra note
25, at 146 ("Careful monitoring of treatment and environmental predictors of
rehospitalization at periodic intervals, beginning with discharge planning, might
prevent a substantial number of readmissions to hospital for chronic schizophre-
nia."); Frances & Weiden, Promoting Compliance with Outpatient Drug Treat-
ment, 38 Hosp. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 1158, 1160 (1987)(clinicians should
maximize the chances of later compliance by a noncompliant patient. "The odds
are high that [the patient] will return to the mental health care system only after
a relapse.... [Tihe patient and family should be advised about the early signs of
relapse to help them seek help before dangerous events occur.").
38. Of course, treatment is assumed to be in the patient's interest also. See Treffert,
supra note 17, at 264:
The freedom to be wandering the streets, psychotic, ill, deteriorating,
and untreated, when there is a reasonable prospect of effective treat-
ment, is not freedom; it is abandonment. The liberty to be naked in a
padded cell in a county jail, hallucinating and tormented, without treat-
ment that ought to be given is not liberty, it is another form of imprison-
ment .... The right to be seriously and obviously mentally ill but to have
to deteriorate to being dangerous before treatment can be given is not a
right; it is insensitivity, purism, and suspicion cruelly presented as
concern.
39. IMDL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16.
40. See Morse, supra note 20, at 67-68; Mulvey, Geller & Roth, supra note 34, at 575.
41. Keilitz & Hall, State Statutes Governing Involuntary Outpatient Civil Commit-
ment, 9 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DisAmrrY L. REP. 378 (1985).
42. See Hiday & Goodman, The Least Restrictive Alternative to Involuntary Hospital-
ization, Outpatient Commitment Its Use and Effectiveness, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 81 (1982).
43. See Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 23. As Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 23,
at 149 found, statutory guidelines alone may not be sufficient to prevent inappro-
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outpatient commitment provisions. Despite a legislative mandate that
committing mental health boards favor treatment alternatives, includ-
ing commitment to outpatient treatment, over inpatient hospitaliza-
tion,44 outpatient commitment remains underutilized in Nebraska.
A study by Wood and Swanson45 illustrates some of the reasons
why outpatient commitment is rarely used in Nebraska. The authors
reviewed the hospital charts of eighteen inpatients who were ran-
domly selected from seventy-four patients who had been committed to
a university-affiliated psychiatric hospital in the Omaha area during a
three-year period. Four inpatients were not transferred to outpatient
treatment because of insufficient response to short-term treatment,
two needed an inpatient drug treatment program, and one patient re-
quested to return to another hospital. Eight patients were transferred
to a less restrictive partial hospitalization program. Of the three who
were recommended for outpatient treatment, two did not keep initial
appointments and one moved to another state.
The Institute on Mental Disability and the Law ("IMDL") of the
National Center for State Courts, in Guidelines for Involuntary Civil
Commitment, suggests that involuntary outpatient civil commitment
should be used cautiously because "its goals are questionable and its
implementation is problematic." 46
Administration of involuntary outpatient commitment as part of a general
commitment scheme requires much more of the mental health-justice system
than was required in times when a court order to commit invariably meant
institutionalization. It requires, most importantly,
(i) careful selection of potential involuntary patients in accordance with the
applicable legal criteria and prerequisites for outpatient commitment (only
some involuntary patients will have the ability to follow a mental health treat-
ment plan in the community);
priate placements ("even after the statutory changes designed to prevent inap-
propriate outpatient commitments, judges in the hearings we studied continued
to order outpatient commitments for patients without the recommendation or
even against the explicit recommendation of hospital and CMHC staff"). How-
ever, legal criteria and judicial discretion must be independent from, although
based on consideration of, opinions of mental health professionals if legal pro-
ceedings are to have any significance beyond a judicial stamp of approval of psy-
chiatric decisionmaking.
44. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1038 (1987):
The disposition ordered by the mental health board shall represent the
alternative which imposes the least restraint upon the liberty of the sub-
ject required to successfully treat the particular mental illness and pre-
vent the particular harm which was the basis for the board's finding the
person to be a mentally ill dangerous person. The board shall consider
all treatment alternatives ... including outpatient treatment.... Full-
time inpatient hospitalization or custody shall be considered a treatment
alternative of last resort.
45. Wood & Swanson, Use of Outpatient Treatment During Civil Commitment: Law
and Practice in Nebraska, 41 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 723 (1985).
46. IMDL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16, Guideline G2.(a).
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(ii) commitment courts that are thoroughly familiar with the continuum of
services available in the community;
(iii) available alternatives to hospitalization that meet the legal, fiscal, and
practical requirements of outpatient commitment orders;
(iv) adequate resources for respondents' supervision while in outpatient
status;
(v) organizational arrangements and procedures for the monitoring and re-
view of the respondent's compliance with the conditions of outpatient commit-
ment; and
(vi) fair and workable rules and procedures for revoking outpatient commit-
ment when necessary.4 7
This article discusses many of the issues which should be addressed in
formulating a comprehensive policy of outpatient commitment. Sec-
tion II describes conditions of outpatient treatment and the differ-
ences between outpatient commitment and conditional release
statutes. In section III, statutory procedures are reviewed and due
process requirements for enforcing an order of outpatient commit-
ment when an outpatient fails or refuses to follow prescribed treat-
ment are discussed. Finally, section IV considers the appropriate
standard for outpatient commitment.
II. COMMITMENT TO OUTPATIENT TREATMENT
A. Outpatient Commitment or Conditional Release?
In most states, statutory provisions for outpatient commitment
have not been widely used4a--undoubtedly due, in part, to the confu-
sion and lack of knowledge about procedures and parameters of statu-
tory authority.49 Involuntary outpatient treatment may be ordered as
a dispositional alternative to inpatient hospitalization pursuant to stat-
utes which authorize or permit outpatient commitment or treatment,
or statutes which require treatment in the least restrictive alternative
setting.50 Alternatively, involuntary outpatient treatment may be or-
dered following a period of inpatient treatment, utilizing statutes
which provide for outpatient commitment, convalescent leave, parole,
or conditional release from inpatient treatment.
47. Id.
48. See J. OwENs, DIVISION OF EDUCATIONAL SERVICES SYSTEMS LIAISON OF THE NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, INVOLUNTARY OUT-PATIENT COMMIT-
MENT. AN EXPLORATION OF THE ISSUES AND ITS UTILIZATION IN FIVE STATES
(1985) [hereinafter INVOLUNTARY OUT-PATIENT COMMITMENT].
49. See Miller, Commitment to Outpatient Treatment A National Survey, 36 HosP.
& COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 265 (1985)(survey results showed significant disagree-
ment between state attorneys general and mental health directors regarding
whether involuntary outpatient commitment was permitted in their state).
50. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.755(b)(1984)("If the court finds that there is a less restric-
tive alternative available and that the respondent has been advised of and refused
voluntary treatment through the alternative, the court may order the less restric-
tive alternative treatment after acceptance by the program of the respondent for
a period not to exceed 90 days.").
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1. Conditional Release
Approximately forty states have statutory provisions for condi-
tional release of an improved mentally ill patient from the hospital to
the community.51 Continuation of the release is dependent upon com-
pliance with certain conditions; often the individual must receive fol-
low-up care at the institution, or from a local clinic or psychiatrist.
Most state statutes do not specify the conditions which the patient
must follow when released,52 and allow the treatment facility to for-
mulate an individualized treatment plan which "may include any con-
ditions which the head of the treatment facility considers to be in the
best interests of the patient or necessary to ensure that the patient is
not likely to cause harm to self or others."53 Some states require out-
patient treatment as a condition for early release54 or specifically re-
quire the taking of medication.55 Connecticut allows placement in a
private boarding home for mentally ill patients or a "chronic and con-
valescent hospital," provided the patient remains subject to the medi-
cal supervision of the superintendent or director of the releasing
facility.56 In Colorado, the professional in charge of providing short-
term treatment may prescribe day care, night care, "or any other simi-
lar mode of treatment" prior to termination of the treatment.5 7
Upon release, the patient is provided a copy of the conditions which
she must follow to remain in the community5 8 and sometimes must
sign a written agreement.59 If the patient fails to adjust to community
life or to comply with the conditions of release, she may be reinstitu-
tionalized.60 Similarly, a patient granted convalescent leave61 or sta-
tus 62 is permitted to live outside the hospital, but is not legally or
unconditionally discharged. Other statutory terms for conditional re-
51. Brakel, Discharge and Transfer in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW,
supra note 5, at 203.
52. Id. at 206.
53. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2924(d)(1983 & Supp. 1989).
54. See IDAHO CODE § 66-338 (1980 & Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-183
(1990)("When, in the opinion of the professional person in charge of a mental
health facility providing involuntary treatment, the committed person can be ap-
propriately served by outpatient care prior to the expiration of the period of com-
mitment, then outpatient care may be required as a condition for early
release .... ).
55. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(13)(dm)(West 1987 & Supp. 1989).
56. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-191 (West 1988).
57. COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-110(1)(1989).
58. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.795(b)(1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.01.C
(1986 & Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 426.278(1)(1989).
59. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-12-241(1)(1989).
60. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-277(a)(1989). See infra Section I. B. regarding
the constitutionality of rehospitalization procedures.
61. E.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 433A.380 (1981).
62. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-21 (1984).
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lease of hospitalized mentally ill patients include temporary release,63
interim community leave,64 provisional discharge,65 trial visit,6 6 fur-
lough,67 parole,68 and conditional outpatient treatment.69
The distinction between conditional release and outpatient com-
mitment is often a fine one,7 0 but it is an important one which may
63. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, par. 3-902(e)(Smith-Hurd 1987).
64. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 4 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990).
65. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.15(1) & (2)(West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
66. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.22 (Anderson 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 426.273(2)
(1987).
67. TEx REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-69 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
68. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-107 (West 1981)(repealed 1987).
69. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.01 (1986).
70. The distinction between conditional release and outpatient commitment becomes
blurry in states such as Wisconsin, where the court may order commitment to
outpatient treatment under the care and custody of a county department. The
court also designates the facility or service. WIs. STAT. § 51.20(13)(a)(3)(1989).
However, the court order directs the county department to release the individual
on a conditional transfer in accordance with the statutory provisions for condi-
tional release from inpatient treatment. Id. at § 51.20(13)(dm). The order pro-
vides that the director of the inpatient facility may request that the individual be
taken into custody by a law enforcement agency upon noncompliance. Because
the director of the inpatient facility has broad discretion to act without further
court authorization or judicial hearing, this procedure would be considered a con-
ditional release, even though the court issues the initial order and even though
the individual may be committed to outpatient treatment initially, and is not nec-
essarily released from inpatient treatment.
Similarly, Tennessee allows the discharge of an inpatient "subject to the obli-
gation to participate in any medically appropriate outpatient treatment." TENN.
CODE ANN. § 33-6-201(b)(2)(1984 & Supp. 1989). Unless judicial review of the out-
patient treatment plan is requested, the court is not involved unless a hearing is
required upon noncompliance (see generally infra Section I .A.) and the hospital
notifies the court of the discharge to outpatient treatment. Id. at § 33-6-201(d).
Following a hearing, the patient may be "re-committed" by the court "to the hos-
pital from which the patient was released." Id. at § 33-6-203(d). The outpatient
treating professional terminates the treatment obligation and notifies the court
and hospital which discharged the patient. Id. at § 33-6-207. The treating profes-
sional may also renew the outpatient treatment obligation for six months if the
outpatient continues to meet the criteria for outpatient treatment after six
months. Id. Because this procedure is initiated and terminated by treatment per-
sonnel and a noncomplying outpatient is returned to the hospital, this statutory
scheme would also be considered a conditional release mechanism, with some ju-
dicial intervention to safeguard patient rights and enforce patient obligations.
In Oregon, the distinction seems to revolve around who will care for the out-
patient. Conditional release may be ordered by a court if requested by a legal
guardian, relative, or friend of the mentally ill person who has the ability and
resources to care for the individual. OR. REv. STAT. § 426.125 (1989). If the court
commits the individual to the Division of Mental Health, the Division may place
the individual in outpatient commitment, but only if an adequate treatment facil-
ity is available. Id. at § 426.130(C)(ii), 426.127(1). Conditional release or commit-
ment may be ordered for up to 180 days. Id. at § 426.130(2). Further, if the
individual is committed to the Division and placed in inpatient treatment, the
Division "may grant a trial visit to the patient for a period of time and under any
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affect decisionmaking authority, the stage at which the outpatient
treatment is provided, and enforcement mechanisms. Conditional re-
lease provisions presume initial inpatient hospitalization, with release
to outpatient status generally resting solely in the discretion of the
director or superintendent of the inpatient facility or the attending
physician.71 The patient is legally committed to the inpatient facility,
but is conditionally released for treatment in the community. 2 Con-
ditional release procedures are thus hospital-oriented and, often, the
outpatient can be rehospitalized at the discretion of treatment person-
nel3 and without formal proceedings or judicial review.7 4
2. Outpatient Commitment
Under outpatient commitment statutes, a mentally ill individual
may be committed to outpatient treatment following a period of insti-
tutionalization, as under conditional release provisions.7 5 An individ-
conditions the division shall establish... if the trial visit is agreed to by the com-
munity mental health and developmental disabilities program director...." Id. at
§§ 426.273(1). Conditional release, outpatient commitment and trial visits are all
subject to the same procedure if the outpatient fails to adhere to the conditions of
outpatient treatment. See id at § 426.275. See also infra notes 180-81 & accompa-
nying text.
71. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.01.B (1986 & Cum. Supp. 1989); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 632.385 (1986 & Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-277(a)(1989). But see
OR. REv. STAT. § 426.130(2)(1989) (court orders conditional release and estab-
lishes a period of commitment up to 180 days).
72. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-107 (West 1981)(patients placed in family care remain
patients of the institution until discharged) (repealed 1987); Wis. STAT.
§ 51.20(13)(f)(1987 & Supp. 1989).
73. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.01(I)(1986 & Supp. 1989)('The medical direc-
tor may rescind an order for conditional outpatient treatment and order the pa-
tient to return to a mental health treatment agency at any time during the period
of court ordered treatment if, in the medical director's judgment, the patient has
failed to comply with a term of the outpatient treatment plan or if, for any rea-
son, the patient needs inpatient treatment"). See also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 29.15(e)(McKinney 1988).
74. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.30.795(c)(1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2924(d)(1983
and Supp. 1990)("If the patient fails to comply with any conditions of the treat-
ment plan, the head of the facility may revoke the release and order the patient
readmitted to the facility. The head of the facility may authorize and order a law
enforcement officer or other person to take into custody and transport the pa-
tient to a treatment facility"). But see WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.05.340(b)(3)(Supp. 1990)("the designated county mental health professional
or the secretary may order that the conditionally released person be apprehended
and taken into custody and temporarily detained in an evaluation and treatment
facility... until such time, not exceeding five days, as a hearing can be scheduled
to determine whether or not the person should be returned to the hospital").
75. See GA. CODE ANN. § 88-506-5(a)(Harrison Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-
182 (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-274(f), 122C-277(a)(1989)(if attending physi-
cian determines a respondent meets the outpatient commitment criteria, the phy-
sician may request a supplemental hearing, at which the court may continue the
original inpatient commitment, order outpatient commitment for up to ninety
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ual also may be committed to outpatient treatment in an initial order,
as a dispositional alternative to inpatient hospitalization. 76 The outpa-
tient is legally committed to the outpatient facility or the care of the
psychiatrist responsible for supervision of the outpatient treatment,
not to an inpatient facility where he may or may not have previously
received treatment.7 7 Outpatient commitment statutes are commu-
nity-oriented and, frequently, more "legally" oriented than condi-
tional release provisions in that the outpatient treatment plan often
must be judicially approved.78 Outpatient staff are responsible for no-
tifying the committing agency79 when an outpatient is not complying
with outpatient treatment or when inpatient treatment is clinically
indicated.80
Noncompliance with the outpatient program does not usually re-
sult in automatic return to inpatient hospitalization.8 ' For example,
in Hawaii-which has a separate statutory procedure for outpatient
commitment-a separate petition for involuntary hospitalization may
be filed in the event of noncompliance.8 2 If the outpatient commit-
ment is successfully completed, the individual is automatically dis-
charged unless another petition is filed. In addition, the outpatient
treatment professional may terminate the outpatient treatment if she
determines the outpatient is no longer a mentally ill person requiring
involuntary treatment.8 3
days, or dismiss the case); MICK. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1472 (2)(b),(3)(b)(West
1980 & Supp. 1990)(if a patient is hospitalized under a 60-day or 90-day order of
hospitalization and continues to require treatment, the court may order alterna-
tive treatment or a combination of hospitalization and alternative treatment for a
period of not more than one year).
76. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.A (Supp. 1989); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 911/
2, para 3-812(a)(Smith-Hurd 1987)(if an individual is found subject to involuntary
admission but not in need of hospitalization, the court may order the person ad-
mitted to a program of alternative treatment. The program must be "capable of
providing adequate and humane treatment which is appropriate" for the individ-
ual's condition); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1469(3)(West 1980 & Supp. 1990).
77. E.g., HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 334-127,334-129 (1985). In Oregon, the individual is com-
mitted to the Division of Mental Health, which may place him in outpatient com-
mitment if placement is available. On. REV. STAT. §§ 426.130(C), 426.127(1)(1989).
78. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36.540.B.2 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
79. "Committing agency" is used to refer to the court or mental health commitment
board which is responsible for issuing orders for involuntary civil commitment in
accordance with state law.
80. MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1469(8)(West 1980 & Supp. 1990); TEx. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5547-52(c)(Vernon Supp. 1990).
81. E.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 334-129(c)(1985). But see A=z. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-
540.d.4 (1986 & Supp. 1989); MiCH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1469(9)(West 1980 &
Supp. 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-21 (1989). See also infra Section I.A. for
discussion of statutory procedures upon noncompliance with outpatient
treatment.
82. HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-129(c)(1985).
83. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-512(b)(Harrison Supp. 1989).
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Just as definitions of outpatient commitment vary, treatment pro-
vided to committed outpatients lacks a standard definition. Hawaii's
outpatient commitment statute defines outpatient treatment to in-
clude medication authorized by court order, individual or group ther-
apy, day programming activities, "services and training, including
educational and vocational activities," supervised living arrangements,
and "any other services prescribed to either alleviate the person's dis-
order or disability, to maintain semi-independent functioning, or to
prevent further deterioration that may reasonably be predicted to re-
sult in the need for hospitalization."8 4 Georgia defines outpatient
treatment as "a program of treatment for mental illness outside a hos-
pital facility setting which includes, without being limited to, medica-
tion and prescription monitoring, individual or group therapy, day or
partial programming activities, case management services, and other
services to alleviate or treat the patient's mental illness so as to main-
tain the patient's semi-independent functioning and to prevent the pa-
tient's becoming an inpatient."85 In Mississippi, alternatives to
inpatient commitment may include, but are not limited to, voluntary
or court-ordered treatment with specific reference to a treatment regi-
men, day or night treatment in a hospital, placement in the custody of
a friend or relative, or the provision of home health services.86 Texas
allows a judge to order a person to participate in outpatient mental
health services, including "programs of community mental health and
mental retardation centers and services provided by a private psychia-
trist or psychologist."87 Wood and Swanson8 8 described an outpatient
program in Nebraska which provided only medication.
Conditional release and outpatient commitment are not mutually
exclusive procedures; a state may appropriately provide for both if
each is clearly defined. For example, in North Carolina, if a court
finds that an individual meets the criteria for outpatient commit-
ment,8 9 involuntary outpatient treatment or a combination of inpa-
tient and outpatient treatment may be ordered for up to ninety days.90
If an inpatient's attending physician determines that the patient meets
the criteria for outpatient commitment, the physician may request a
84. HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-122(c)(1985).
85. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-501(12.2)(Harrison Supp. 1989).
86. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73(4)(Supp. 1990).
87. TIx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-51(d)(2)(Vernon Supp. 1990).
88. Wood & Swanson, supra note 45, at 727 (adult outpatient service of a university-
affiliated psychiatric hospital in the Omaha area).
89. See infra note 334.
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-271(a)(1), (b)(1),(2)(1989). Other states which allow com-
mitment to outpatient or combined inpatient and outpatient treatment include
Arizona (ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.A.2 (1986 & Supp 1989)); Georgia (GA.
CODE ANN. § 88-506.2 (Harrison Supp. 1989)); Michigan (MCm. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 330.1468(2)(c),(d),(3)(c),(d)(West 1980 & Supp. 1990); and Pennsylvania (PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(f)(Purdon Supp. 1989).
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supplemental hearing (in which case the court decides the issue), or
the physician may release the patient for periods of up to thirty days
"on specified medically appropriate conditions."91
As currently written, Nebraska statutes seem to provide for condi-
tional release (the mental health board may hold a hearing to deter-
mine whether "a person who has received mental health board-
ordered treatment is adhering to the conditions of his or her release
from treatment, including the taking of medication" 92 ) as well as con-
valescent leave (the superintendent must notify the mental health
board when a nonvoluntary patient is ready for discharge or convales-
cent leave93) and outpatient commitment-both as a less restrictive
alternatives in the initial order (the mental health board shall con-
sider all treatment alternatives, including outpatient treatment 94 ) and
following inpatient treatment (if a less restrictive alternative exists,
the mental health board shall change the treatment disposition 95).
However, the Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act fails to pro-
vide specific procedures or guidelines concerning such issues as who
bears responsibility for informing the board of the availability and ap-
propriateness of treatment alternatives, what is the board's role in
conditional release or convalescent leave, how compliance with outpa-
tient treatment should be monitored, who has enforcement authority,
and what is the permissible length of outpatient treatment.
Legislative Bill 723, currently before the Nebraska Unicameral,
proposes to amend Neb. Rev. Stat. 83-1062 to include the following def-
inition of outpatient treatment:
Sec. 3. Outpatient treatment shall mean a mental health board order di-
recting a person to comply with specified treatment requirements, not involv-
ing the continuous supervision of the person in a residential setting, that are
reasonably designed to alleviate or reduce the person's illness or disability or
to maintain or prevent deterioration of the person's mental or emotional func-
tioning. The specified requirements may include, but need not be limited to,
(a) taking prescribed medication, (b) reporting to a facility for treatment or to
permit monitoring of the person's condition, or (c) participating in individual
or group therapy or educational or vocational programs.9 6
B. Outpatient Treatment
1. Treatment Planning
The distinction between hospital-oriented and community-oriented
outpatient statutes is also reflected in treatment planning. Condi-
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-277(a)(1989). NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1080 (1987).
92. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1080 (1987).
93. Id. at § 83-340.01.
94. Id. at § 83-1038.
95. Id. at § 83-1046.
96. See infra notes 150 and 202 regarding other provisions of L.B. 723, 92d Leg., 2d
Sess. (1990).
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tional release statutes often provide for formulation and modification
of the treatment plan by the institution releasing the patient. For ex-
ample, in Kansas the outpatient facility must inform the head of the
releasing facility of any material noncompliance with the treatment
plan, and it is the head of the inpatient facility who may change the
treatment plan or the specified conditions.97 In Arizona, the medical
director issues the order for conditional outpatient treatment (which
includes an outpatient treatment plan prepared by inpatient staff),
and the director may amend the plan during outpatient treatment.98
This approach may be desirable insofar as a treatment team has deter-
mined the medication regimen most beneficial to the individual, par-
ticularly if the subject will receive outpatient treatment at the same
facility or with the same psychiatrist or staff who provided inpatient
treatment. However, such laws fail to consider that, upon release,
many patients return home to a different community, and treatment
will be continued at a local community mental health center. Sec-
ondly, if the individual was hospitalized only briefly, long-term treat-
ment effects may not be evident. The individual's new therapist is in a
better position to determine the client's continuing needs. Thirdly,
statutes which make the director of the inpatient facility responsible
for a patient receiving outpatient treatment9 9 may cause a reluctance
to release patients as early as may be possible or desirable, particularly
if the outpatient treatment continues at a different facility or in a dif-
ferent community from the inpatient facility.
Several states' conditional release statutes require that an initial
outpatient treatment plan be developed in cooperation with both the
original inpatient facility and the outpatient facility or physician re-
sponsible for outpatient care.10o The Texas statute also includes con-
sultation with the patient. 0 1 The Montana and Tennessee statutes
provide that the outpatient facility or the professional in charge of the
97. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2924(d)(1983 & Supp. 1989). See also WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 51.20(13)(b)(2),(dm)(West 1987 & Supp. 1990).
98. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.01 (1986 & Supp 1989).
99. E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 632.385(1)(Supp. 1990)("Release to the least restrictive en-
vironment shall include provisions for continuing responsibility to and by the fa-
cility"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-21(A)(1989)("Release on convalescent status
shall include provisions for continuing responsibility to and of the hospital"); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 51.20(13)(f)(West 1987 & Supp. 1990)("The county department shall
have ongoing responsibility to review the individual's needs" when an individual
is released on a conditional transfer and placed in a treatment program). But see
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.469(3)(West 1986)("Placement on convalescent status shall
include provisions for continuing responsibility by a professional or facility in the
community"); W. VA. CODE § 27-7-2 (1986)("Release on convalescent status shall
include provisions for continuing responsibility to and by a mental health facility,
not necessarily the facility in which the patient was previously hospitalized").
100. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 27A-14-13 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-
201(b)(2)(1984 & Supp. 1990).
101. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-67(a)(Vernon Supp. 1990).
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patient's case may modify the treatment plan or place of treatment
when the patient has been conditionally released. 0 2
Under outpatient commitment statutes, the court is often required
to designate in the commitment order the outpatient treatment center
or psychiatrist who will provide or supervise outpatient treatment.1 0 3
Texas requires the individual responsible for court-ordered outpatient
services to submit a "general program of treatment" within two weeks
of the court's order of outpatient commitment. 0 4 The treatment pro-
gram is then incorporated into the court's order. Whether the initial
plan is developed by the inpatient or evaluating facility alone,1 05 in
cooperation with the outpatient facility,' 06 or by the outpatient facil-
ity,'0 7 the plan should incorporate the experience of the inpatient fa-
cility in treating the patient, and provide for modifications as needed
by the designated outpatient psychiatrist or facility. The committing
agency should be notified of substantial changes in the treatment
plan,0s with judicial review available when warranted.09 If the modi-
fication involves a change in treatment facility or psychiatrist, the
committing agency should make or approve the change."i 0
The individualized"i treatment plan should be comprehensive and
address the mental and physical needs of each patient, including medi-
cation, psychotherapy, housing, employment, and special needs."12
102. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-183(2)(1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-201(e)(Supp.
1990). See also On. REV. STAT. § 426.273(5)(1989)("the director of the community
mental health program... may modify the conditions for continued trial visit").
103. E.g., MIcH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 330.1469(5)(West 1980 & Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 122C-267(h), 122C-271(b)(4)(1989).
104. TFx REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-52(b)(Vernon Supp. 1990).
105. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, para. 3-810 (Smith-Hurd 1987)(preliminary plan
prepared prior to disposition).
106. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-509(b)(Harrison Supp. 1989)(the "referring facility" shall
prepare an individualized service plan for the patient in consultation with the
"receiving facility").
107. OR. REV. STAT. § 426.127 (1989).
108. See, eg., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-52(c)(Vernon Supp. 1990).
109. See ic. at art. 5547-53(a). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-201(c)(1984 & Supp.
1990)(outpatient may request judicial review of treatment plan within forty-eight
hours).
110. See TEx. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-53 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
111. According to Miinkoff, supra note 6, at 947, "[tjhere is no such thing as ideal treat-
ment for chronic patients as a group. "Treatment of the chronically mentally ill
involves "psychopharmacologic interventions to assist the ill person to acknowl-
edge, bear, and accept the illness. Psychosocial interventions also help the indi-
vidual to learn new coping strategies and rehabilitative skills to facilitate the
process of adaptation." Id.
112. Goering, Wasylenki, Lancee & Freeman, supra note 32, at 672 (effective aftercare
must include more programs with a rehabilitative/educational approach in outpa-
tient community settings; the need for aftercare services in areas other than med-
ical/therapeutic care is often underestimated by discharge planners); Hogarty,
Goldberg & Schooler, Drug and Sociotherapy in the Aftercare of Schizophrenic
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Further, an individual ready for the daily decisions of community liv-
ing should be involved as much as possible in the formulation of the
plan and informed of available community services."13 Michigan pro-
vides a procedure whereby an individual in a program of alternative
treatment or combined hospitalization and alternative treatment may
submit a complaint to the provider of services regarding the quality
and appropriateness of the treatment provided. A copy of the com-
plaint and the provider's response is submitted to the court.11 4 Such
measures have little practical effect, however, if alternative programs
are nonexistent.
Nebraska law provides that, as part of the order of final disposition,
the committing mental health board is authorized to designate "the
director or other representative of the treatment program or facility
to which the subject is assigned, to be responsible for supervising the
preparation and implementation of an individualized treatment plan"
and for recording and reporting the patient's progress to the board.115
Thus, an outpatient treatment center or psychiatrist apparently could
be designated such responsibility. The treatment plan must contain
a statement of the nature of the specific mental and physical problems and
needs of the subject, a statement of the least restrictive treatment conditions
necessary to achieve the purposes of the board's order ... and a description of
intermediate and long-range treatment goals, with a projected timetable for
their attainment. 1 1 6
An outpatient treatment plan might also include a description of
services and treatment to be administered, including possible side ef-
fects of medication and alternatives, if any; the settings in which treat-
ment will be provided; identities of specific facilities and individuals
who will provide treatment; and a statement of the criteria for uncon-
ditional release from involuntary treatment' 1 17 Preparation of an af-
Patients, 31 ARCHrVES GEN. PsYCHIATRY 609, 609 (1974)("appropriate sociother-
apeutic intervention, administered in the context of chemotherapy, represents
the ideal strategy for enhancing the adjustment and performance of schizo-
phrenic patients in aftercare").
113. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2918a(a)(Supp. 1990)(in ordering outpatient treatment,
the court shall consider all relevant factors, including the preferences of the pa-
tient); MIcH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 330.1469(1)(West 1980 & Supp. 1990)('"!e court
shall inquire as to the desires of the individual regarding alternatives to hospitali-
zation"); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 29.15(f)(McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1988)(pro-
vides opportunity for patient to actively participate in the development of the
outpatient treatment plan).
114. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1483(2)(West 1980 & Supp. 1990).
115. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1044 (1987).
116. Id.
117. IMDL SUPPLEMENT supra note 16, Guideline H2.(b); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.15
(West 1982 & Supp. 1990)("Each patient released on provisional discharge shall
have an aftercare plan developed which specifies . .. the precise goals for the
granting of a final discharge, . . . [and] the grounds upon which a provisional dis-
charge may be revoked").
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tercare plan for institutionalized mentally ill persons should be a
routine practice for patients being released into the community, even
if no legal sanctions are attached."18 In Virginia, the director of a state
hospital may discharge recovered patients after the preparation of a
predischarge plan formulated in cooperation with the community
services board. The plan must (i) specify the community services re-
quired to meet the individual's needs for treatment, housing, nutri-
tion, physical care, and safety; (ii) specify any income subsidies for
which the individual is eligible; (iii) identify all local and state agen-
cies which will be involved in providing treatment and support; and
(iv) specify services which would be appropriate for the individual but
which are currently unavailable.n 9 In addition to helping place indi-
viduals in appropriate programs as services become available, a spe-
cific finding in all treatment plans of the most appropriate treatment
would enable decisionmakers to respond to the changing needs of the
population of mentally ill persons in need of services in various
regions.
2. Review
Periodic review of each patient's mental condition is necessary to
determine whether continued commitment is justified and whether
modification of the treatment plan or treatment setting is required.
Regular examination of patients' needs encourages appropriate treat-
ment and prompt discharge when involuntary treatment is no longer
needed or the basis for the commitment no longer exists.
A majority of states have statutes requiring periodic examination
of patients, with the frequency of examinations ranging from every
thirty days to annually. 2 0 In addition, most states require periodic
review of patient records, including the treatment plan.1 2 ' For exam-
118. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-67(a)(Vernon Supp. 1990)(discharged pa-
tients may refuse the services in a plan for aftercare); Bachrach, supra note 25;
Meyerson & Herman, What's New in Aftercare? A Review of Recent Literature,
34 HosP. & ComMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 333 (1983).
119. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-98A (1984 & Supp. 1990).
120. Weiner, supra note 5, at 268, lists 31 states plus the District of Columbia. Twelve
of these states also permit review upon the petition of the patient or other person.
See, eg., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-51.B (1986 & Supp. 1989)(reexaminations by
appropriate professional persons each 90 days; full physical examination once per
year); W. VA. CODE § 27-7-1 (1986)(chief medical officer shall continually review
the case of each involuntary patient and "shall as frequently as practicable, in any
event at least once every three months, cause a complete psychiatric examination
of each patient" and discharge patients when the commitment criteria are no
longer satisfied or treatment is no longer beneficial).
121. Id. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 911/2, para. 3-209 (Smith-Hurd 1987)(treatment
plan shall be reviewed and updated as the patient's clinical condition warrants,
but not less than every 30 days) and para. 3-814:
Not more than 30 days after admission... the facility director shall file a
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ple, Georgia requires review of outpatient treatment plans at "regular
intervals" to determine the outpatient's progress toward the stated
goals of the plan and to determine "whether the plan should be modi-
fied because of the patient's present condition." 122 Nebraska requires
the filing of a "progress report" to the mental health commitment
board at least every ninety days for one year after the filing of the
initial individualized treatment plans and every six months
thereafter.123
Although outpatients' conditions are monitored regularly during
outpatient treatment and progress noted, a written determination of
each outpatient's status should be completed at periodic intervals'2 4
and a copy submitted to the committing agency. In Michigan, the di-
rector of an alternative treatment program must review an outpa-
tient's status as a person requiring treatment six months after an
order of alternative treatment or of combined hospitalization and al-
ternative treatment.1 25 If an outpatient was hospitalized prior to be-
ginning outpatient treatment, the director of the hospital may
participate in the review. The results of the review are included
within each patient's records and filed with the committing court
within five days. 2 6 The results are also provided to the patient and
his attorney, guardian, or relative.127
Some commentators assert that the failure of states, such as Ne-
braska, to require regular examination of each patient is inconsistent
with the principle of least restrictive treatment. "If a disabled person
receives only an annual examination or record check, he could remain
for many months in a setting or regimen that is not justified by his
clinical condition."' 2 8 This is a particular concern in Nebraska, which
current treatment plan with the court which includes an evaluation of
the patient's progress and the extent to which he is benefiting from
treatment. The court shall review the treatment plan.... The patient or
an interested person on his behalf may request a hearing or the court on
its own motion may order a hearing to review the treatment plan. If the
court is satisfied that the patient is benefiting from treatment, it may
continue the original order for the remainder of the admission period. If
the court is not so satisfied, it may modify its original order or it may
order the patient discharged.
122. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-512(a)(Harrison Supp. 1989). See also CAPLAN, supra note 8,
at 121 (effective follow-up services must provide for "periodic review of each case
to make sure that the patient continues to progress"); Stromberg & Stone, supra
note 26, at 382 (model law).
123. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1045 (1987).
124. The frequency of examinations and reports will depend upon the period of allow-
able outpatient commitment. If outpatient commitment is allowed for six months
plus extensions, for example, then reports might be required every ninety days.
125. MICH. COmP. LAws ANN. § 330.1482(2)(West 1980 & Supp. 1990).
126. Id. at § 330.1483.
127. Id.
128. Weiner, supra note 5, at 268.
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allows commitment for an indeterminate period. 29 In a study of the
use of outpatient treatment as a less restrictive disposition for involun-
tarily committed patients, Wood and Swanson30 noted a trend in Ne-
braska toward lengthy periods of commitment and a reluctance of
clinicians to end commitment.
3. Right to Refuse Outpatient Treatment
The differences between legal and medical approaches to involun-
tary treatment are evident in issues pertaining to patients' rights to
refuse prescribed treatment. Because psychotropic medication'sl is
the primary treatment provided to most psychiatric patientsl 32-- par-
ticularly chronic patients with severe disorders133--efforts to limit the
discretion of mental health professionals to forcibly medicate'34 invol-
untarily committed patients have met with strong resistance.
Although most "right to refuse treatment" cases have involved the
right to refuse antipsychotic medication during inpatient commit-
ment,1 35 similar issues arise in an outpatient setting. Courts have
129. Nebraska is one of only nine states which still permit indefinite commitments.
Brakel, supra note 5, at 72.
130. Wood & Swanson, supra note 45.
131. "Psychotropic" medication includes antipsychotic drugs (major tranquilizers) for
schizophrenia and related psychoses; antidepressant drugs for biochemical de-
pression; lithium for treatment of manic-depressive (bipolar) disorder; and an-
tianxiety drugs for situational and neurotic anxiety. Weiner, Treatment Rights,
in THE MENTALLY DisABLED AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 328.
132. Id. at 341.
133. Carpenter, McGlashan & Strauss, The Treatment of Acute Schizophrenia With-
out Drugs: An Investigation of Some Current Assumptions, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 14,14 (1977)("the treatment of schizophrenia has become so extensively drug
oriented that a significant impediment has arisen to the exploration of alternative
therapeutic approaches"); Gardos & Cole, Maintenance Antipsychotic Therapy:
Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 32 (1976); Kane,
Treatment of Schizophrenia, 13 SCHIZOPHRENIA BuLL. 133, 134 (1987)("Antip-
sychotic drugs remain the primary modality in the treatment of an acute episode
or an acute exacerbation of a schizophrenic illness").
134. Forcible medication may include forced medication by injection and also the
threat of forced medication upon refusal to voluntarily take medication orally.
Rogers v. Okins, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361 (D. Mass. 1979).
135. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1214
(1985) (absent an emergency, forcible medication with antipsychotic drugs violates
inmate's due process rights); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir.
1983) (due process requires an opportunity for hearing and review of a decision to
administer antipsychotic medication but hearing need not be judicial); Rennie v.
Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981)(enforced administration of antipsychotic drugs
implicates fourteenth amendment right to be free from unjustified intrusions on
personal security), vacated and remanded in light of Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307 (1982); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980)(fourteenth amend-
ment due process rights of privacy, bodily integrity and personal security), va-
cated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Knecht v.
Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 1973)(eighth amendment prohibition
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often recognized a qualified right of a competent mentally ill patient
to refuse medication absent an emergency. 3 6 Although the definition
of "emergency" varies,13 7 as well as specification of the decision-
against cruel and unusual punishment); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th
Cir. 1973)(first amendment right of freedom from interference with thought
processes); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971)(right of a Christian Scien-
tist to refuse medication found in first amendment guarantee of freedom of reli-
gion), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971). See also United States v. Bryant, 670 F.
Supp. 840 (D. Minn. 1987)(convicted federal prisoner has protected liberty inter-
est in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic medication, but
court need only make certain that professional judgment was exercised). Cf.
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)(professional judgment standard).
136. See Walters v. Western State Hosp., 864 F.2d 695 (10th Cir. 1988)(constitutional
right to refuse psychotropic drugs "clearly established"). Cf. Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)(government officials performing discretionary func-
tions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights).
But see Lappe v. Loeffelholz, 815 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1987)(whether a prison in-
mate who was conditionally released from a security medical facility was entitled
to a hearing before being forcibly medicated when he refused treatment was not
clearly established in 1983).
However, the qualified right to refuse treatment has been eroded by some
federal courts' interpretation of the deference to professional judgment sanc-
tioned by the United States Supreme Court in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307
(1982). See, e.g., United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 313 (4th Cir. 1988)(en
banc) (under professional judgment standard, question is not whether the decision
was the medically correct or most appropriate one; it is only whether the decision
was made by an appropriate professional in the exercise of professional judgment,
i.e., not arbitrarily. Due process is denied only if the decision was reached by a
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or stan-
dards); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983)(on remand).
Nonetheless, state courts are free to interpret state constitutions more
broadly. See, e.g., State ex rel Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710, 416 N.W.2d
883 (1987)(statutes which permit competent involuntarily committed individuals
to be forcibly administered psychotropic drugs but require a finding of probable
cause to believe precommitment detainees are incompetent before medication
may be administered violate equal protection clauses of federal and state consti-
tutions); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y.
1986)(due process clause of New York Constitution affords involuntarily commit-
ted mental patients fundamental right to refuse antipsychotic medication, but
right is not absolute); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985)(competent and
incompetent mentally ill persons have qualified right to refuse treatment that
poses a significant risk to their physical well-being under common law and Colo-
rado's statutory commitment scheme); Rogers v. Commissioner of the Dep't of
Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983)(mental patient does not lose
right to make treatment decisions until adjudicated incompetent).
137. See Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 656 (1st Cir. 1980) ("the need to prevent violence
in a particular situation outweighs the possibility of harm" from the medication);
Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 42 (Mass. 1981)("an unforeseen combination
of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action")(quoting
WEBSTER'S THiRD NEW INT'L DICIONARY 741 (1961); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp.
1342, 1365 (D. Mass. 1979)("a situation in which failure to [medicate] would result
in a substantial likelihood of physical harm to that patient, other patients, or to
staff members of the institution"); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1154
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maker who may override a refusal of medication, 3 8 a mentally dis-
abled person is generally considered competent unless and until he is
declared legally incompetent in a separate proceeding.139
Unfortunately, patients are still often treated as clinically incom-
petent in institutional settings,140 even though many patients may be
capable of rationally participating in treatment decisions.141 The per-
centage of competent patients should be especially high for the pa-
tients who are stabilized or in remission and likely to be placed on
outpatient commitment. Although some commentators assume the
right to refuse treatment is necessarily sacrificed during outpatient
commitment, 4 2 this proposition is not self-evident. Arguably, if a pa-
tient will unequivocally refuse outpatient treatment, he is not a suita-
ble candidate for outpatient commitment.143  However, even
(D.N.J. 1978)("a sudden, significant change in the [patient's] condition which cre-
ates danger to the patient himself or to others in the hospital").
138. See Rogers v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458
N.E.2d 308 (1983)(courts); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266,269 (3d Cir. 1983)("medi-
cal authorities' professional judgment").
139. Weiner, Treatment Rights, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra
note 5, at 341. See, e-g., State ex reL Jones v. Gerhardstein, 135 Wis. 2d 161, 178,
400 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986)(incompetency not inferred from status of
involuntary commitment); NEB. REv. STAT. § 1066(1)(1987)(persons in custody or
receiving involuntary treatment have the right to be considered legally compe-
tent for all purposes unless they have been declared legally incompetent; mental
health boards do not have power to declare an individual incompetent).
140. Weiner, Treatment Rights, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra
note 5, at 341, 348. See Roth, Meisel & Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to
Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 279 (1977)('In psychiatry the entire edi-
fice of involuntary treatment is erected on the supposed incompetence of some
people to voluntarily seek and consent to needed treatment").
141. For example, in Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 927 n.8 (N.D. Ohio 1980), the
court found that 85% of the patients at Lima State Hospital were capable of ra-
tionally deciding whether to consent to the use of psychotropic drugs, and noted
that few of the other 15% had been found incapable by a neutral party or tribu-
nal. See also Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361 (D. Mass. 1979)('"he weight
of evidence persuades this court that, although committed mental patients do suf-
fer at least some impairment of their relationship to reality, most are able to
appreciate the benefits, risks, and discomfort that may reasonably be expected
from receiving psychotropic medication").
142. Mulvey, Geller & Roth, supra note 34, at 576-77 ("By definition, a person cannot
refuse treatment while being involuntarily committed on an outpatient basis").
143. See eg., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.C(1)(c)(Supp. 1989)(outpatient or com-
bined inpatient and outpatient treatment may be ordered only if the court finds
that the patient will follow a prescribed outpatient treatment plan). Although a
patient who is likely to comply with outpatient treatment arguably does not need
involuntary commitment, some patients are more likely to comply if they are
obligated to do so under a court order. Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-20(1)(C)-
(D)(1984 & Supp. 1989)(patients may be discharged to outpatient treatment if
"the patient is likely to participate in outpatient treatment with a legal obligation
to do so; and the patient is not likely to participate in outpatient treatment unless
legally obligated to do so").
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incompetent noninstitutionalized patients may be entitled to a judicial
determination of substituted judgment in which "the determination is
not what is medically in the ward's best interests.... The determina-
tion [is] what the incompetent individual would do if
competent... ."144
In Guardianship of Roe,145 a mentally ill and incompetent ward
was living at home following institutionalization at a state hospital.
The ward's father had been appointed permanent guardian and was
granted the authority to consent to the forcible administration of an-
tipsychotic medication by a probate judge. On appeal, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that, "where no emergency ex-
ists, antipsychotic medication may be forcibly administered to a nonin-
stitutionalized individual only in accordance with a court order."146 A
judge may order forcible medication when: 1) a judicial substituted
judgment indicates the incompetent individual would accept antip-
sychotic drugs if he were competent; or 2) a state interest of sufficient
magnitude exists to override the individual's right to refuse. If the
state interest is the prevention of violence by noninstitutionalized
mentally ill individuals, "the State is entitled to force the individual to
choose, by way of substituted judgment, either involuntary commit-
ment or medication with antipsychotic drugs."147
However, individuals placed on outpatient commitment are already
involuntarily committed; their choice would be between hospitaliza-
tion and forcible medication. Massachusetts makes no statutory provi-
sion for outpatient commitment, though,14s and other language in the
opinion suggests that "involuntary commitment" is, in this context,
being used synonymously with inpatient hospitalization.149
Some outpatient statutes, in effect, abrogate the right to refuse
treatment on the basis of past histories and anticipated future need.150
144. Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 52 (Mass. 1981)(emphasis in original).
145. 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981).
146. Id. at 61.
147. Id.
148. Geller, supra note 11, at 1262.
149. See Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 58 (Mass. 1981):
If an incompetent has enjoyed close family relationships and subse-
quently is forced to choose between two treatments, one of which will
allow him to live at home with his family and the other of which will
require the relative isolation of an institution, then the judge must weigh
in his determination the affection and assistance offered by the incompe-
tent's family.
But cf. IMDL SuPPLEMENT, supra note 16, Guideline G.2 ("Involuntary civil com-
mitment is not necessarily synonymous with institutionalization. Compulsory
hospitalization should be considered along with other available dispositional al-
ternatives, including commitment to outpatient mental health facilities").
150. Bursten, supra note 23, at 1256 (Tennessee law).
L.B. 723, 92d Leg., 2d Sess. (1990) proposes to amend NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1062
(1987), which permits "[a]ny qualified mental health professional, upon being au-
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Other states permit psychopharmacological treatment following judi-
cial or administrative review of the necessity for biological treatment
based on a second medical opinion. 5 ' In Wisconsin, an individual con-
ditionally transferred to outpatient treatment may be taken into cus-
tody upon noncompliance with his treatment plan and prescribed
medication "may be administered voluntarily or against the will of the
individual... ,"152 In Georgia, a noncomplying outpatient may be
given any "emergency or other medical treatment."153 If forcible
medication is permitted during outpatient treatment, with fewer pa-
tient safeguards than are required for inpatient treatment and the pos-
sibility of blood checks to monitor compliance,154 outpatient
commitment loses much of its attractiveness as a less restrictive alter-
native to inpatient hospitalization. 5 5
thorized by the director of the mental health center or government, private, or
state hospital having custody of the subject," to provide "appropriate medical
treatment" for a subject against whom a certificate or petition has been filed, by
adding the following language:
The subject may be physically required to take prescribed medication
against his or her will, if such treatment is essential in the judgment of
the mental health professional in charge of such treatment to prevent
the subject from causing injury to himself, herself, or others or which
will substantially improve his or her mental illness. This section specifi-
cally authorizes injection of medication against the wishes of the subject
if ordered by a mental health professional in charge of such treatment.
Cf. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1066(3)(1987)(subjects "in custody or receiving treat-
ment" have the right to "refuse treatment, except such treatment as is essential
in the judgment of the mental health professional in charge of such treatment to
prevent the patient from causing injury to himself or others or which will sub-
stantially improve his or her mental illness"). When read in conjunction with
proposed § 83-1002, sec. 4 (see infra note 202 and accompanying text), LB 723
appears intended to permit forcible medication of noncomplying outpatients.
151. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2927a(b)(1983 & Supp. 1990)(objections to prescribed
medication must be submitted to administrative review). In Nebraska, persons
receiving involuntary treatment have the right to refuse treatment, "except such
treatment as is essential in the judgment of the medical health professional in
charge of such treatment to prevent the patient from causing injury to himself or
others or which will substantially improve his or her mental illness." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 83-1066(3)(1987).
152. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(13)(dm)(West 1987 & Supp. 1989). C. i. at
§ 51.61(g)("Following a final commitment order, the subject individual does not
have the right to refuse medication and treatment except as provided by this sec-
tion"). But see State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 135 Wis. 2d 161, 400 N.W.2d 1
(Wis. Ct. App. 1986)(involuntarily committed patients denied equal protection be-
cause statutes allow them to be forcibly medicated but do not permit forcible
administration of drugs to voluntary psychiatric patients; state's interest in cost-
efficient treatment not sufficient to justify unequal treatment of involuntarily
committed).
153. GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-82(b)(Harrison Supp. 1989).
154. See Geller, supra note 11; Mulvey, Geller, & Roth, supra note 34, at 576 ("the
most efficient and valid way to monitor compliance with a chemically based treat-
ment program is to use methods such as regular depot injections or blood tests").
155. Compare Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 23, at 149 ("Outpatient commitment
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A number of empirical questions deserve analysis before outpa-
tients are denied a qualified right to refuse medication. How many
patients refuse treatment and how many simply fail to comply? What
are the reasons for their noncompliance? How often does an emer-
gency situation arise in which a patient's refusal may be overridden?
How many patients are declared incompetent to make rational and
informed treatment decisions?
A variety of implications may, of course, flow from the answers to
such questions. If patients fail to follow prescribed treatment because
they deny their illness, then perhaps a legal decree would encourage
them to comply without requiring them to admit their illness (which
is not entirely desirable but may be a step in the right direction).15 6 If
they refuse because of religious convictions, then perhaps their deci-
sion requires deference.157 If they refuse because they have been pre-
scribed psychotic medication before and have experienced side
effects,5s then perhaps a competent individual should be allowed to
provides an alternative that is actually more liberal for patients than either re-
lease or extended hospitalizations, but that remains unacceptable to many civil
libertarian attorneys and judges") with Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 52
(Mass. 1981)("few legitimate medical procedures... are more intrusive than the
forcible injection of antipsychotic medication").
156. See Frances & Weiden, supra note 37, at 1159; Geller, supra note 11, at 1262;
Schwartz, A Revised Checklist to Obtain Consent to Treatment with Medication,
31 HosP. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 765, 766 (1980):
In the denial stage, the patient's capacity to give informed consent is not
present or is very limited; he is still incompetent to evaluate his illness,
although he may appear competent... in other respects. At this stage it
may be destructive to confront the patient with facts about his illness
and details of treatment or to insist on informed consent. This step may
... impede his progress toward eventual acceptance of his illness and the
treatment for it.
157. See Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971)(forced medication of involunta-
rily hospitalized mentally ill Christian Scientist violated right to freedom of reli-
gion); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979)(mentally ill person who was
adjudicated incompetent but had previously rejected use of medication on reli-
gious grounds was entitled to substituted judgment).
158. See State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 135 Wis. 2d 161, 170, 400 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1986)("In certain cases it is possible that an involuntarily committed in-
dividual may retain the competency to gauge the advantages and disadvantages of
psychotropic drugs. This is particulary true where the individual concerned has
suffered, or witnessed, adverse reactions to such drugs in the past"). The most
common side effects of antipsychotic medications are muscular effects which dis-
appear when the drug is terminated: dystonic reactions (muscle spasms, irregular
flexing, writhing or grimacing movements; protrusion of the tongue); akathesia
(inability to stay still, restlessness, agitation) and Parkinsonisms (mask-like face,
drooling, muscle stiffness and rigidity, shuffling gait, tremors). Plotkin, Limiting
the Therapeutic Orgy: Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. REv.
461, 475 (1977). Non-muscular effects include "drowsiness, weakness, weight
gain, dizziness, fainting, low blood pressure, dry mouth, blurred vision, loss of
sexual desire, frigidity, apathy, depression, constipation, diarrhea, and changes in
the blood." Id. at 475-76. Tardive dyskinesia is the most serious, and long-term,
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choose the course which she considers less intrusive: hospitalization
without medication or community treatment with medication and side
effects.159 For a patient who simply misses appointments or does not
consistently or appropriately take medication but does not refuse to do
so, greater involvement and outreach efforts of community mental
health professionals in monitoring compliance may be what is needed.
Another possibility is that patients who are accustomed to commu-
nity life in a deteriorated state will achieve a capacity for insight
which will encourage continued voluntary compliance after a thresh-
old of time in successful community treatment is reached.160 If this
were the case, involuntary medication might be justified for a limited
period of time to allow these individuals to reach the threshold. The
possibility also exists that few outpatients would refuse medication,161
and giving committed outpatients a choice may enhance the benefits
of treatment and give them a sense of greater control over their lives
and treatment.162
effect of antipsychotic drugs. Tardive dyskinesia causes convulsive muscle move-
ments and may interfere with speech, eating, dexterity, and respiration. G. BUR-
ROWS, T. NORMAN & B. DAviES, DRUGS IN PsYCHIATRY: ANTipsYcHOTICS 186
(1985). Currently, no effective treatment for tardive dyskinesia is available, id. at
186, 199, 205, and its prevalence appears to be increasing. Id. at 188.
159. See Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51 (Mass. 1981):
If the judge finds that there is a State interest sufficient to override the
[incompetent] ward's choice to refuse treatment, but finds that the State
interest can be satisfied by means other than forced medication, we then
require... that the ward be afforded an extended substituted judgment
determination in order to choose from among all acceptable and avail-
able means of satisfying the State interest.
See also id. at 58 ("Clearly any competent patient choosing whether to accept
such treatment would consider the severity of these side effects, the probability
that they would occur, and the circumstances in which they would be endured");
Rogers v. Okn, 478 F. Supp. 1342,1361 (D. Mass. 1979)("patients who have exper-
ienced such medication... have some basis for assessing comparative advantages
and disadvantages"); Bachrach, supra note 7, at 99 ('"hat is restrictive for one
patient may not necessarily be so for another"). Cf. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387,
1396 (10th Cir. 1984)("less restrictive alternatives, such as segregation or the use
of less controversial drugs like tranquilizers or sedatives, should be ruled out
before resorting to antipsychotic drugs").
160. See Mulvey, Geller, & Roth, supra note 34, at 578-79; Geller, supra note 11, at
1262-63.
161. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342,1369 (D. Mass. 1979)(during litigation, only
twelve of 1,000 patients actually refused medication); Appelbaum & Gutheil,
Drug RefusaL A Study of Psychiatric Inpatients, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 340
(1980)(most inpatient refusers subsequently accepted medication; permitting re-
fusals did not seriously impair overall treatment and yielded some positive advan-
tages); Brooks, The Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications, 8
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 179 (1980).
162. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361 (D. Mass. 1979)("a fundamental con-
cept for treating the mentally ill is the establishment of a therapeutic alliance
between psychiatrist and patient Implicit in such an alliance is an understanding
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Hiday and Scheid-Cook163 studied a group of 69 outpatients com-
mitted in Noith Carolina between July 1984 and June 1985. Outcomes
at six months were compared for chronically mentally ill patients with
histories of medication refusal and dangerousness who were ordered
to receive outpatient treatment and similar patients who were re-
leased or voluntarily hospitalized following civil commitment hear-
ings. A target group with the characteristics of revolving-door
patients was identified on the basis of four criteria: 1) severe mental
illness, generally including patients with diagnoses of schizophrenia,
paranoia, affective disorder, or other psychotic disorders; 2) one or
more previous hospitalizations; 3) one or more dangerous actions,
indicated by incidents of assaults, threats, or unintentional harm to
self or other, or attacks on property; and 4) recent medication
noncompliance.
The authors found that a majority of the target group (52.8%)164
had refused medication at least once during the six-month period. Pa-
tients committed to outpatient treatment were less likely to refuse
medication than patients who had been released, but were no more
likely to refuse than were the patients who had been involuntarily
hospitalized. Patients who were either released or committed to out-
patient treatment were more likely than hospitalized patients to be
noncompliant in actions such as keeping appointments or attending
prescribed programs. Such results are not surprising; given the struc-
tured setting of most institutions, inpatients generally do not have the
option of forgetting appointments or choosing not to attend. Further,
only 31 of the 69 patients who were committed to outpatient treatment
actually began outpatient treatment. Patients who began outpatient
treatment had lower rates of medication refusal and other forms of
noncompliance than committed outpatients;165 70.3% of committed
and acceptance by the patient of a prescribed treatment program"); Rennie v.
Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1141 (D. N.J. 1978):
[A] trusting relationship or therapeutic alliance between psychiatrist and
patient is essential for a drug regimen to succeed .... [P]sychotropic
drugs are less efficacious in a hostile or negative environment.... [E]ven
if the best drug is prescribed, if the patient is unwilling to accept it, the
positive effects are greatly lessened, especially in terms of long range
benefits.
(citations omitted); Schwartz, supra note 156, at 267 ("Chronic patients and those
requiring long-term maintenance with psychotropics should be asked for consent
repeatedly to ensure a valid informed consent. In addition to reviewing side-ef-
fects and gains, seeking consent periodically is an occasion for patient and doctor
to renew their therapeutic alliance"). But see Perr, Refusing Treatment-Who
Shall Decide?, 10 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 233, 243 (1982).
163. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, A Follow-Up of Chronic Patients Committed to Outpatient
Treatment, 40 HOsp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 52 (1989); Hiday & Scheid-Cook,
supra note 23.
164. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 23, at 225, Table 3.
165. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 163, at 57.
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outpatients who received outpatient treatment did not refuse medica-
tion even once.166
The effectiveness of medication in the treatment of the chronically
mentally ill may vary with individual patients and, in some cases, may
be more harmful than beneficial. 167 Until more information is avail-
able regarding noncompliance and how well the goals of outpatient
commitment are achieved in practice, we should defer to the right of a
competent outpatient to refuse medication in the absence of an
emergency.168
If a committed outpatient faces an emergency situation, procedures
166. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 23, at 225-26.
167. See Anthony, Cohen & Vitalo, The Measurement of Rehabilitation Outcome, 4
SCHIZOPHRENIA BuLL. 365, 369 (1978)("The serious and often irreversible compli-
cations of prolonged maintenance medication can interfere with rehabilitation
programs.... While drug therapy can often support the initial rehabilitation
intervention, long-term maintenance medication may actually hamper rehabilita-
tion programming"); Carpenter, McGlashan & Strauss, supra note 133, at 14 (fail-
ing to use neuroleptics during an acute psychotic episode does not necessarily
result in a disadvantageous course and outcome, and it may have some advan-
tages"), and at 19 ("antipsychotic medication may make some schizophrenic pa-
tients more vulnerable to future relapse than would be the case in the natural
course of their illness"); Franklin, Kittredge & Thrasher, A Survey of Factors
Related to Mental Hospital Readmissions, 26 Hosp. & COMmUNITY PSYCHIATRY
749, 751 (no significant differences found between discharged state mental hospi-
tal patients who were readmitted and those not readmitted in medications pre-
scribed, use of medications, lengths of prescription, dosages and current use of
medication); Gardos & Cole, supra note 133, at 35-36 (as many as 50% of outpa-
tient schizophrenic patients might not be worse off if their medications were
withdrawn; some relapses after antipsychotic withdrawal are attributable to
withdrawal emergent dyskinesia rather than to psychotic decompensation; be-
cause of serious complications of prolonged antipsychotic therapy, every chronic
schizophrenic outpatient maintained on antipsychotic medication should have the
benefit of an adequate trial without drugs). But see Hogarty, Goldberg, Schooler
& Ulrich, Drug and Sociotherapy in the Aftercare of Schizophrenic Patients, 31
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 603 (1974)(relapse rate for placebo group of dis-
charged schizophrenic patients nearly twice as high as a comparable group of pa-
tients treated with drugs). See also Davis, Gosenfeld & Tsai, Maintenance
Antipsychotic Drugs Do Prevent Relapse" A Reply to Tobias and MacDonald, 83
PSYCHOLOGICAL BuuL. 431 (1976); Hogarty, Treatment and Course of Schizophre-
nia, 3 ScHIzoPHRENIA BuLL. 587, 594 (1977)("the discontinuation of any treat-
ment, be it chemotherapeutic, social, psychological, or behavioral, results in a
reversal of initial treatment-related gains"); MacDonald & Tobias, Withdrawal
Causes Relapse? Our Response, 83 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 448 (1976); Tobias &
MacDonald, Withdrawal of Maintenance Drugs with Long-Term Hospitalized
Mental Patients: A Critical Review, 81 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL 107 (1974).
168. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-512 (1986)(A person undergoing evaluation or
treatment has a right to refuse any and all medical treatment unless ordered by
the court, except when, in the written opinion of the attending physician, a true
medical emergency exists); Morse, supra note 20, at 93 ("as long as a person is
capable of expressing a preference about hospitalization and treatment, the state
should not be able to substitute its judgment for that preference").
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for emergency treatment should be instituted.169 For example, North
Carolina's outpatient commitment law states, "In no case may the re-
spondent be physically forced to take medication or forcibly detained
for treatment unless he poses an immediate danger to himself or
others. In such cases inpatient commitment proceedings shall be initi-
ated."'170 Hawaii provides that no subject of an outpatient commit-
ment order "shall be physically forced to take medication or forcibly
detained for treatment... ."171 If the subject refuses or fails to comply
after reasonable efforts are made by the outpatient treatment staff to
obtain compliance, the treating psychiatrist may submit a petition for
involuntary hospitalization, but the refusal of treatment may not be
considered as evidence for meeting the criteria for involuntary
hospitalization.
Hawaii and North Carolina both have a lower standard for outpa-
tient commitment than is required for inpatient commitment.172
Thus, involuntary outpatients might not meet the statutory criteria
for involuntary inpatient treatment-or forcible medication.173 States
with the same standard for involuntary inpatient or outpatient treat-
ment should, at a minimum, grant the same qualified right to refuse
medication to outpatients as is afforded inpatients.
III. ENFORCEMENT: REVOCATION OF OUTPATIENT
COMMITMENT
A. Statutory Procedures
As noted in the previous section, outpatient treatment may be pro-
vided to mentally ill persons through either conditional release or out-
patient commitment statutes. Enforcement of outpatient orders is
considered essential for effectiveness. 174 Without adequate monitor-
ing of compliance, outpatient treatment may, in practice, be no differ-
ent from unconditional release or no treatment.
169. Most states have special statutory provisions for emergency detention of danger-
ous mentally ill persons. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1020 (1987). Medical cer-
tification is most common, see Brakel, supra note 5, at 51, with 3-5 days the most
common limits for length of emergency detention. Id. A variation of this proce-
dure for persons committed to outpatient treatment would permit inpatient treat-
ment for a limited period of time in an emergency. At the end of the allowable
period, the individual would be released or, if inpatient treatment is deemed nec-
essary, a hearing for transfer to a more restrictive setting or a petition for inpa-
tient treatment could be initiated. See infra p. 70.
170. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-273(a)(3)(1989).
171. HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-129(b)(1985).
172. See infra section IV.
173. See Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 60 (Mass. 1981)(same standard of proof
necessary for both involuntary commitment and involuntary medication
proceedings).
174. See IMDL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16, at 10.
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Failure or refusal of the outpatient to comply with prescribed
treatment may have varying consequences under these provisions. Vi-
olation of a conditional release often results in automatic return to the
releasing facility.175 Conditional release statutes which involve judi-
cial authority generally require that the court be notified of the condi-
tions of release and the return of an outpatient to inpatient
treatment.176 Judicial review may be available, at the patient's re-
quest, following rehospitalization.177 Texas requires an administrative
hearing before a patient's furlough can be revoked.178 In Montana, a
petition for rehospitalization of a patient conditionally released from
an inpatient mental health facility may be filed by the county attor-
ney, the professional person in charge of the patient's case, or the pa-
tient's next of kin. The court may order revocation and
hospitalization if, after a hearing, the court finds by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that "the conditionally released patient has violated a
condition of the release, that the violation has caused a deterioration
of the patient's mental condition, and that as a result of this deteriora-
tion the patient can no longer be appropriately served by outpatient
care." 179
Oregon follows the same procedures for an outpatient who fails to
adhere to the conditions of treatment under outpatient commitment,
conditional release, or a trial visit. The court "may cause the [outpa-
tient] to be brought before [the court] for a hearing to determine
whether the person is or is not adhering to the terms and conditions of
the placement." 8 0 The outpatient is accorded all rights with respect
to notice, detention, hearing and counsel as at an initial commitment
hearing.81 Similarly, in Washington, the grounds and procedures for
revocation are the same for conditional release and hospitalization al-
ternatives. The court must determine whether the outpatient adhered
to the conditions of outpatient treatment or whether "substantial de-
terioration" in the person's functioning has occurred and whether the
175. See supra notes 73 and 74.
176. Eg., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.795(b),(c)(1984); ARLz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.01.I
(1986 & Supp. 1989); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.340(1)(a)(Cum. Supp. 1990);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-69(e)(Vernon Supp. 1990).
177. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.01.J (1986 & Supp. 1989); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 632.385(5)(Supp. 1990)("Upon a receipt of a notification returning the patient to
the facility as an inpatient, the committing court shall, if necessary order the
sheriff or other law enforcement official to apprehend and transport the patient
to the facility. The committing court may, on its own motion and shall upon the
respondent's motion, order a hearing to be held on the need for such change.");
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.35(1)(e)(West 1987 & Supp. 1989).
178. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-69(d)(Vernon Supp. 1990).
179. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-197 (b)(1989).
180. Op. REv. STAT. § 426.275(2)(1989).
181. Id.
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conditions should be modified or the patient returned to the facility. 8 2
Outpatient commitment statutes generally require judicial order or
modification in order to hospitalize a noncomplying outpatient. How-
ever, the procedural safeguards vary widely. Arizona, 8 3 Michigan, 5 4
and North Dakotal8s5 allow the court to enter a new order requiring
hospitalization without a hearing, based solely upon the record and
other available information. If the person refuses to comply with the
new order, the court may direct a peace officer to take the person into
protective custody and transport him to the hospital.8 6 Judicial re-
view may be available upon rehospitalization. 8 7
Some states, such as IllinoisB8 and Oklahoma, 8 9 provide notice to
the outpatient and allow an opportunity for the outpatient to respond
prior to modification or revocation of the outpatient order. In Illinois,
a court which revokes an outpatient treatment order may order a
peace officer to take the patient into custody and transport him to the
facility.190 In South Carolina, the court may order inpatient treatment
following a supplemental hearing.191 Vermont allows modification of
the original order or entrance of a new order for hospitalization fol-
lowing a new hearing.192
Other states provide a full and fair hearing but allow hospitaliza-
tion of a noncomplying outpatient prior to the hearing. In Texas, the
court may order temporary detention pending a modification hearing
if the court finds probable cause to believe the outpatient meets the
criteria for court-ordered treatment and that inpatient detention is
necessary for evaluation of the appropriate setting for continued treat-
ment.193 North Dakota permits a peace officer, physician, or mental
health professional who reasonably believes that an outpatient is not
complying with an order for alternative treatment, or that the alterna-
tive treatment is not sufficient to prevent harm, to have the outpatient
182. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.340(b)(3)(Cum. Supp. 1990).
183. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.E.4 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
184. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1469(9)(West 1980 & Supp. 1990).
185. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-21 (Supp. 1987).
186. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.E.4 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
187. Id.
188. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, para. 3-812(b)(Smith-Hurd 1987).
189. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 5-405 (West Supp. 1990).
190. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, para. 3-812(c)(Smith-Hurd 1987).
191. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1989).
192. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7618(b)(1),(2)(1987)(if it comes to the attention of the
court either that the patient is not complying with an outpatient treatment order
or that alternative treatment has not been adequate to meet the patient's treat-
ment needs, the court may, after proper hearing- (1) modify its original order and
direct the patient to undergo another program of alternative treatment for the
remainder of the 90-day period of commitment; or (2) enter a new order directing
that the patient be hospitalized for the remainder of the 90-day period).
193. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-53(c)(Vernon Supp. 1990).
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taken into custody and detained in a treatment facility if "considera-
tions of time and safety do not allow intervention by a court."194
Georgia distinguishes the situation in which the outpatient physi-
cian determines that hospitalization is necessary because of a change
in the patient's condition from the situation in which an outpatient
fails or refuses to comply with outpatient treatment. In the former
situation, the physician may execute a certificate for emergency treat-
ment.195 In the case of a noncomplying outpatient, the outpatient phy-
sician may petition the court for an order authorizing a peace officer to
deliver the outpatient to the outpatient treatment facility or the near-
est emergency receiving facility.196 Following examination, the outpa-
tient may be given any emergency or other medical treatment and
must be released within four hours (forty-eight hours for an emer-
gency receiving facility) unless the physician concludes that, because
of a change in the outpatient's condition, hospitalization is required-
in which case an emergency certificate may be executed.197
North Carolina and Hawaii require the outpatient physician or
center to make "all reasonable effort" to solicit compliance. 98 In
North Carolina, such efforts must be documented and reported to the
court with a request for a supplemental hearing. If the court deter-
mines the outpatient failed or refused to comply, the court may order
an examination to determine the necessity for continued outpatient
commitment or for inpatient commitment,199 reissue or change the
outpatient commitment order, or discharge the outpatient and dismiss
the case. If the outpatient fails to comply but does not clearly refuse
treatment, after reasonable efforts to solicit compliance fail, the out-
patient treatment physician or center may request the court to order a
law enforcement officer to take the noncomplying outpatient into cus-
tody and transport him to the designated outpatient physician or
center for examination.20 0 In Hawaii, after efforts to solicit compli-
ance fail, the outpatient psychiatrist must notify the court and may
submit a petition for involuntary hospitalization.201
In Nebraska, Legislative Bill 723 proposes to amend Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 83-1002 to include the following:
Sec. 4. Outpatient treatment ordered by a mental health board constitutes a
continuing authorization for the sheriff, upon request of the treatment facility
194. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-21 (Supp. 1987).
195. GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-41 -82 (Harrison Supp. 1989).
196. Id. at § 37-3-82(b).
197. Id.
198. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-273(a)(1)(1989); HAW. REv. STAT. § 334-129(c)(1985).
199. The court may order an examination only upon a finding of probable cause to
believe the respondent is mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 122C-274(c)(1)(1989).
200. Id. at § 122C-273(a)(2).
201. HAW. REv. STAT. § 334-129(c)(1985).
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or a mental health professional, to transport a subject to the treatment facility
or the mental health professional's office for the purpose of making efforts to
obtain the subject's compliance with requirements of the outpatient treatment
order. The subject shall not be detained at the facility or the mental health
professional's office for more than three hours.2 0 2
In contrast to similar procedures in states such as Georgia, North
Carolina, and Hawaii, Nebraska's proposed procedure would bypass
the need for a court order to involuntarily transport an outpatient to
the treatment center. Thus, the treating professional could directly
order a peace officer to take an outpatient into custody. This proce-
dure might not be objectionable in and of itself; however, this bill
would also permit the noncomplying outpatient to be forcibly medi-
cated at the sole discretion of the treating professional.203 This result
is unacceptable, particularly if the commitment criteria are broadened
to include not only currently mentally ill and dangerous persons, but
also persons who are not currently dangerous but are considered
"likely to suffer substantial mental or physical deterioration" without
treatment.204
B. Constitutional Requirements
Although statutory provisions for the care and treatment of men-
tally disabled persons are the primary responsibility of the states, pro-
cedures for enforcement and revocation of outpatient commitment or
conditional release must meet the minimum requirements of the
United States Constitution. Constitutional protections for the men-
tally ill have been found within the Due Process Clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 205 The requirements of due process apply if the
asserted interest being threatened by state action is within the scope
of the liberty or property language of the fourteenth amendment.2 o6
The initial determination of whether an individual is entitled to any
procedural protection involves an examination of the extent to which
the person will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss" by the alleg-
edly arbitrary action of the state.2 07
The Supreme Court has characterized involuntary confinement for
treatment of mental illness as a "massive curtailment of liberty."208
202. L.B. 723, 92d Leg., 2d Sess. (1990).
203. See supra note 150.
204. See supra note 19.
205. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law").
206. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
207. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970)(quoting Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
208. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
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As Chief Justice Burger stated in O'Connor v. Donalcson,209 "There
can be no doubt that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital,
like involuntary confinement of an individual for any reason, is a dep-
rivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish without due pro-
cess of law."210 Further, Morr-issey v. Brewer2 11 and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli 22 grant persons such as parolees and probationers protec-
tion from deprivation of conditional liberty without due process, even
though revocation is not a stage of criminal prosecution.
In Meisel v. Kremmens,21 3 a federal district court in Pennsylvania
examined the "conditional liberty" enjoyed by a person who is re-
leased on parole after commitment to a mental institution. 4 The
judge concluded:
I cannot see how the "conditional liberty" of the paroled mental patient dif-
fers in any significant respect from the "conditional liberty" of the paroled
criminal or the paroled drug dependent person. Accordingly, I hold that the
former likewise falls within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment and
must be protected by the constitutional safeguards of due process. 2 15
The rationale of the Meisel decision was followed by another fed-
eral district court in Lewis v. Donahue.216 The plaintiff in Lewis was
released on outpatient status after being involuntarily committed to a
state mental hospital in Oklahoma. Two and one half months later
she was rehospitalized pursuant to Oklahoma statutes, which provided
for the revocation of outpatient status by judicial order, issued summa-
rily, upon ex parte application.21 7 The court held that the patient had
a constitutionally protected interest in her conditional liberty, and
that the statutory scheme for rehospitalization denied the patient due
process because revocation was permitted without notice or opportu-
nity to be heard before rehospitalization. In reaching its conclusion,
the court stated:
209. 422 U.S. 563 (1975)(Burger, C.J., concurring).
210. Id. at 580.
211. 408 U.S. 471 (1972)(the conditional liberty of a paroled criminal falls within the
scope of the fourteenth amendment and is entitled to the protection of the Due
Process Clause).
212. 411 U.S. 778 (1973)(probation revocation results in loss of liberty;, probationer is
entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing).
213. 405 F. Supp. 1253 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
214. Id. at 1256.
215. Id.
216. 437 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Okla. 1977).
217. The Oklahoma Mental Health Law, OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, 73 § (6)(1979), provided
in relevant part-
In the event authorization is necessary to accomplish the return to the
hospital of the patient on convalescent leave, such authority is hereby
vested in the county judge of the county where the patient is located.
Law enforcement officers are authorized to detain and transport a pa-
tient on convalescent leave to the hospital pursuant to an order by the
county judge.
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The granting of out-patient standing did change plaintiff's situation-she
ceased to be a person who was institutionalized and became a person permit-
ted to enjoy a substantial degree of liberty. Conversely, revocation of leave
effected an involuntary transfer from a relatively non-restrictive environment
to a restrictive one, and a correlative deprivation of a measure of freedom....
[A]n out-patient's enjoyment of his liberty is conditioned only upon his not
again becoming a danger to himself or others.
A leave may properly be indeterminate, or terminable upon the happening
of certain conditions. But it cannot be denied that conditional, as well as abso-
lute, rights fall "within the contemplation of the 'liberty or property' language
of the Fourteenth Amendment."2 1 8
Although the analogy to the liberty interest in parole of a con-
victed criminal cannot be extended too far,219 most courts are likely to
find that a mental patient conditionally released from hospitalization
has a liberty interest in that status which cannot be terminated with-
out due process. 2 20 The critical inquiry, of course, concerns what pro-
cess is due for an outpatient facing revocation.
In Mathews v. Eldridge,221 the Supreme Court outlined three fac-
tors which must be considered in identifying the specific dictates of
due process:
[Flirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
218. Lewis v. Donahue, 437 F. Supp. 112, 114 (M.D. Okla. 1977)(citation omitted).
219. Some courts have emphasized the differences between the revocation of a mental
patient's conditional release and that of a convict's parole or probation. See
Hooks v. Jaquith, 318 So. 2d 860, 862 (Miss. 1975), in which the Mississippi
Supreme Court rejected the claim by a mental health patient whose conditional
release had been revoked that he was entitled to habeas corpus relief because
termination without a hearing unlawfully deprived him of liberty. The court
stressed that revocation of a patient's conditional release is a medical determina-
tion rather than a factual or adversarial decision. Because outpatient status in-
volves continuing treatment, the dictates of due process were not deemed
germane to a mental health patient who has previously been lawfully committed
to hospitalization.
220. See In re Mills, 467 A.2d 971 (D.C. 1983)(outpatient has conditional liberty inter-
est in continuing outpatient status unless hospital can prove hospitalization is the
least restrictive alternative); Ball v. Jones, 43 A.D.2d 281, 284, 351 N.Y.S.2d 199,
203-04 (1974), aff'd sub nom. Pannell v. Jones, 36 N.Y.2d 339, 368 N.Y.S.2d 467,
329 N.E.2d 159 (1975)(summary revocation of aftercare status and return of drug-
dependent outpatients to inpatient status inflicts as "grievous" a loss as does revo-
cation of parole); Government of the United States ex rel. Shaban v. Essen, 386 F.
Supp. 1042 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd without opinion, 516 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1975)(rev-
ocation of outpatient status of drug-dependent person is unconstitutional without
written notice and an opportunity to be heard); In re Bye, 12 Cal. 3d 96, 102, 115
Cal. Rptr. 382, 386, 524 P.2d 854, 859 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 996 (1975)(the
label of "civil" rather than "penal" "does not alter the applicability of due process
protections to the outpatient's [narcotics addict's] conditional liberty interest").
221. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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tute procedural requirements would entail.
2 2 2
As the Supreme Court noted in Morrissey v. Brewer,223 due process
is flexible and "calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.... Its flexibility is in its scope once it has been
determined that some process is due; it is a recognition that not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure" 224
In Morrissey, two convicts alleged they were denied due process
because their paroles had been revoked without a hearing. The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that due process requires a reasonably
prompt informal inquiry conducted by an impartial hearing officer
near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest prior to revoca-
tion. The purpose of the hearing is to determine whether reasonable
grounds exist to believe a parole violation has occurred. The parolee is
entitled to speak in his own behalf, to present evidence and cross-ex-
amine adverse witnesses,22 5 and to be provided with an informal state-
ment of reasons for a decision revoking parole as well as an indication
of the evidence upon which the decisionmaker relied. At the revoca-
tion hearing-which must promptly follow the preliminary hearing-
the parolee is entitled to:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure .. . of
evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-ex-
amine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good
cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing
body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial
officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the
evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.2 2 6
Some courts have concluded that a pre-revocation hearing is re-
quired for outpatients as well as parolees. In Lewis v. Donahue,227 the
court granted the declaratory and injunctive relief the plaintiff sought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although the court declined to prescribe spe-
cific procedures which must be provided as a matter of law,228 the
court concluded that a statute which permits the revocation of outpa-
222. Id. at 334-35.
223. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
224. Id. at 481.
225. "However, if the hearing officer determines that an informant would be subjected
to risk of harm if his identity were disclosed, he need not be subjected to confron-
tation and cross-examination." Id. at 487.
226. Id. at 489.
227. 437 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Okla. 1977).
228. Federal courts are generally reluctant to interfere in state mental health systems
by outlining specific procedures required by due process. See, eg., C.R. v. Adams,
649 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1981)(abstention proper, in part because of the unsettled
state of Iowa law regarding whether an outpatient has a right, under Iowa law, to
notice and a hearing before his status is revoked and he is returned to an institu-
tion for inpatient treatment).
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tient leave without notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to rein-
stitutionalization does not comport with due process.
Several courts have applied Morrissey to the outpatient setting
and, consequently, have required a pre-revocation hearing. Penn-
sylvania's statute provided for summary revocation of leaves of ab-
sence from state mental health facilities at the discretion of the
director of the facility.229 In Meisel v. Kremmens,23 0 the plaintiff
sought declaratory relief when his leave of absence was terminated
based on information supplied by his father. The plaintiff was de-
tained without an opportunity to challenge the factual and medical
bases of the revocation. The federal district court concluded that the
principles announced in Morrissey were controlling, thus, the statute
was unconstitutional as violative of rights secured by the Due Process
Clause.
Similarly, in Ball v. Jones,231 all the procedural safeguards man-
dated by Morrissey were held applicable to the revocation of narcotics
addicts' aftercare status. In Pannell v. Jones,232 the New York Court
of Appeals modified the lower court's order:
When an outpatient's conduct, or external factors, unequivocally suggest that
reconfinement is medically necessary, only a limited hearing is required. The
outpatient is entitled to be informed of the reasons for reconfinement, prefer-
ably in writing .... and must be given the right to respond. The hearing need
only be a summary and informal appearance before an administrator ....
Where the outpatient's conduct, or external factors, are equivocal or have
only a tangential relationship to the medical problems of the patient then both
a preliminary and final hearing are required before reconfinement may be or-
dered. The procedures then are substantially the same as for parole revoca-
tion .... 233
229. Section 419 of the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 50, § 4419 (Purdon 1969) provided:
(a) the director of any facility, in his discretion, may allow a leave of
absence to any person admitted or committed... for a period not exceed-
ing one year, and upon such terms and conditions as he may prescribe
consistent with regulations of the department and the director may re-
new or extend a leave of absence for an additional period or periods not
exceeding one year for each such renewal or extension.
(b) Leaves of absence may be terminated by the director who may, if
necessary, authorize the apprehension and return of the person [on
leave] ... by any sheriff, constable or police officer who shall apprehend
and return such person.
(c) Whenever a leave of absence is granted or extended to a period of
three years and such leave is not terminated by the director .... upon
the expiration of such three year period, the person admitted or commit-
ted shall be deemed to be discharged.
Section 419 has since been repealed, except as applied to mentally retarded per-
sons. See id. at Supp. 1988.
230. 405 F. Supp. 1253 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
231. 43 A.D.2d 281, 351 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1974).
232. 36 N.Y.2d 339, 368 N.Y.S.2d 467, 329 N.E.2d 159 (1975).
233. Id. at 343, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 471, 329 N.E.2d at 161-62 (emphasis added).
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The court of appeals did not specify whether the limited hearing for
"unequivocal" outpatients must occur prior to revocation, but that re-
sult seems likely in light of the order of the appellate divisions 4 the
need to determine whether reconfinement is medically necessary (ie.,
the court of appeals' test for whether a revocation hearing is also re-
quired), and the requirement of both a preliminary and final hearing
before reconfinement for "equivocal" outpatients.=5
However, reliance upon the criminal analogy is limited for deter-
mining what process is due a mental patient whose conditional release
is subject to revocation. The Supreme Court has recognized that sig-
nificant differences between the criminal setting and the civil commit-
ment setting necessitate different due process considerations.23 6 In
Addington v. Texas,2 7 the Court found the "clear and convincing"
standard appropriate for involuntary civil commitment proceedings.
In rejecting the higher criminal standard of proof, Chief Justice Bur-
ger declared that "a civil commitment proceeding can in no sense be
equated to a criminal prosecution."2 3 Three distinctions between the
civil commitment and criminal settings were noted. First, in civil com-
mitment proceedings, the state's power is exercised to provide care
and treatment, whereas the state's power is exercised punitively in
criminal convictions. Second, because of the continuing administra-
tive review of a mental patient's condition,2 3 9 the risk of an erroneous
civil commitment is less than the risk of an erroneous criminal convic-
tion. Finally, the inquiry in criminal proceedings is addressed to spe-
cific, ascertainable facts, whereas commitment proceedings require
interpretations of diagnoses and predictions of future behavior based
on imprecise factors.240
A court may recognize a protectible "conditional liberty" interest
234. The appellate division, in applying Morrissey, required both an informal pre-rev-
ocation hearing and a revocation hearing. The court of appeals did not overturn
the decision; thus, elimination of the requirement of a revocation hearing did not
alter the requirement of an informal hearing.
235. Of course, the court's analysis may be flawed in that, if reconfinement is not
"medically necessary," a constitutional basis for hospitalization may be lacking.
See discussion of Birl v. Wallis, infra text accompanying notes 279-90.
236. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)(when parents seek to have their child
committed, or the state attempts to commit a ward of the state in voluntary com-
mitment proceedings, fewer procedural protections are required than in juvenile
delinquency proceedings).
237. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
238. Id. at 428.
239. See supra Section H.B.2.
240. The medical nature of civil commitment issues was also stressed in Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)(procedural safeguards for transfer of prisoners to
mental institutions). See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979)("the sup-
posed protections of an adversary proceeding to determine the appropriateness of
medical decisions for the commitment and treatment of mental and emotional
illness may well be more illusory than real").
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under the fourteenth amendment yet find the state's outpatient or
conditional release statute constitutional. In Dietrich v. Brooks,241 the
Oregon Court of Appeals concluded the "profound differences of na-
ture, degree and function" between parole and conditional release
made different due process considerations appropriate.= Oregon
statutes provided that only trial visits of less than ninety days could be
terminated without a hearing.24 3 Parole, on the other hand, is discre-
tionary and limited only by the expiration of the parolee's sentence.
The court stressed that termination of conditional release is not an
isolated event; rather, it is part of a sequence of events within a course
of confinement and treatment.4 The court held that Oregon's over-
all statutory scheme of involuntary commitment afforded adequate
procedural protections upon summary revocation of conditional re-
lease. By statute, revocation of trial visits of more than ninety days
required an administrative hearing, including the right to counsel,
within seven days of rehospitalization. 245
The California Supreme Court concluded in In re Bye246 that "the
entire panoply of procedures outlined in Morrissey as applicable to pa-
role revocations is neither constitutionally mandated nor practically
desirable" in summary revocations of an addict's outpatient status.24 7
Mr. Bye's outpatient status was revoked because his parole agent
feared his imminent return to narcotics based on reports by neighbors
that Bye was behaving irrationally. The court recognized that a
prompt in-community hearing may, in appropriate cases, be helpful to
an outpatient suspected of violating the conditions of his release, but
concluded that, on balance, "due process does not require such a pre-
liminary determination in those cases where the outpatient is appre-
hended for reasons relating to resumed narcotic use or for symptoms
or actions indicating the imminent danger of return to narcotic
use."24 8
The court's concern was not with the substantive soundness of the
revocation decision, but rather in establishing procedures to insure the
decision is based upon all relevant facts. The court reasoned that the
medical nature of the revocation decision and the need for prompt re-
turn of an addict who is in remission outweigh the "legitimate" need
241. 27 Or. App. 821, 558 P.2d 357 (1976).
242. Id. at 825, 558 P.2d at 360.
243. OR. REV. STAT. § 426.290 (repealed 1985).
244. Dietrich v. Brooks, 27 Or. App. 821, 827, 558 P.2d 357, 360 (1976). The court's
distinction is, however, a weak one; the court's statement is also applicable to
parole.
245. Id. at 826, 558 P.2d at 359.
246. 12 Cal. 3d 96, 524 P.2d 854, 115 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 996
(1975).
247. Id. at 98, 524 P.2d at 856, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
248. Id. at 106, 524 P.2d at 861, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
[Vol. 69:346
1990] INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT COMITMVNT 387
to attack the accuracy of the complainant's perceptions and state-
ments at a preliminary hearing.2 4 9 Thus, outpatients "who are taken
into custody for purported violations of their outpatient status which
do not indicate an imminent return to narcotics may nevertheless be
accorded the same unitary revocation procedure."Mo The court ac-
corded great weight to the need for immediate return of a "defaulting"
outpatient to the treatment facility.2 51 As a result, the court rejected
the reasoning of the Ball court, which considered a preliminary hear-
ing necessary because of an anticipated time lag between arrest and
eventual disposition. However, the Bye court did suggest that a differ-
ent result might be warranted if the Narcotic Addict Evaluation Au-
thority could not comply with the prompt return policy.
Further, the court concluded that upon the addict's return to the
treatment facility, he must be provided with a written statement
enumerating the charges against him, the evidence relied upon, and
the names of the witnesses who offered evidence against him. The
patient must also be informed in writing of the right to challenge the
truth of the charges at a revocation hearing which must be held
shortly after his return to the facility. At the formal hearing, the six
Morrissey requirements apply, as well as the right to representation
by counsel when deemed necessary.
The same reasoning was applied to mentally ill outpatients in In re
Anderson.25 2 The respondent had been released on outpatient status
from the state mental hospital, where he had been admitted following
his acquittal on an insanity plea. He was summarily returned ten
months later on the initiative of local mental health personnel. The
court noted that the habeas corpus relief provided by statute is an af-
ter-the-fact determination, whereas "[tihe fundamental mandate of
the Fourteenth Amendment is that a person be afforded notice and an
opportunity to be heard prior to deprivation of a significant liberty or
property interest."2 5 3 Further, habeas corpus relief is not mandatory.
However, the court concluded that the need for immediate recommit-
ment and the medical nature of the decision render an in-community
preliminary hearing inappropriate. As in Bye, the court found a uni-
tary hearing is required as soon as reasonably possible following the
patient's return to the hospital.
The Idaho Supreme Court also found a post-revocation hearing suf-
ficient due process protection for outpatients in In re True.25 4 The
district court had quashed the habeas writ of a conditionally released
249. Id. at 107, 524 P.2d at 861, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
250. Id. at 109, 524 P.2d at 863, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
251. Id. at 107, 524 P.2d at 862, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
252. 73 Cal. App. 3d 38, 140 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1977).
253. Id. at 45, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 551 (citation omitted).
254. 103 Idaho 151, 645 P.2d 891 (1982).
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outpatient who was summarily returned to the hospital. The Idaho
Supreme Court balanced the outpatient's interest in insuring that the
revocation is based on an accurate diagnosis and evaluation of the facts
against the state's need to conduct its program of treatment with a
minimum of judicial interference. The court concluded that, although
mental patients are entitled to due process in revocation of conditional
release, the important differences from the parole system "are such
that the procedures outlined in Morrissey for parole revocation, both
in terms of timing and formality, are inappropriate .... "2 55 The court
reasoned that the governmental interest involved in a decision to
rehospitalize a patient concerns the protection of society and/or the
patient; thus, "timing becomes more critical" than in the parole set-
ting.2 The court also noted that deference must be given to decisions
which are "peculiarly medical in nature and as such are less subject to
objective inquiry than in the parole system."2 5 7
The court determined that the statutory provisions enabling a
mental patient to seek an after-the-fact determination of the propriety
of an order of rehospitalization did not adequately protect the inter-
ests of a patient or assure meaningful review. Further, the provisions
placed the burden on the patient to bring forth sufficient facts to jus-
tify relief from an order of rehospitalization. "It is the state, in cases
where it seeks to deprive an individual of a protectible liberty or prop-
erty interest, which must bring forth sufficient facts justifying its sum-
mary action."2s8 However, because of the "great weight"259 accorded
the need for immediate rehospitalization, the court concluded the gen-
eral rule that an individual be given a hearing before he is deprived of
a protectible interest is inapplicable. "The situation present when a
decision is made to revoke the conditional release status of the patient
is extraordinary: the patient because of a suspected remission in his
mental condition possibly poses a danger to others and/or to
hiMself."260
In order to guard against an erroneous decision that rehospitaliza-
tion is warranted, the court outlined the minimal due process
requirements:
(1) prompt written notice to the patient of the reasons for and evidence
relied on justifying rehospitalization as well as notice of the right to challenge
the allegations and (2) a hearing before a neutral hearing body to be held as
255. Id. at 161, 645 P.2d at 901.
256. Id. at 162, 645 P.2d at 902. Of course, parole violations might also concern the
protection of society; the court's concern seems to focus on the protection of the
individual, whose "progress toward recovery... is seriously jeopardized by a re-
mission which is left untreated." Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 160, 645 P.2d at 900 (citations omitted).
259. Id. at 162, 645 P.2d at 902.
260. Id.
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soon as is reasonably possible following the patient's rehospitalization, at
which time the patient is to be afforded the right to counsel, the right to pres-
ent evidence and examine witnesses, and upon a decision sustaining the order
of rehospitalization, the right to a written statement by the fact-finding body
as to the reasons for revocation... 261
However, Justice Bistline, concurring specially, applied the same
due process balancing test of Mathews v. Edridge2 upon which the
majority relied and found that the restrictions on liberty were beyond
those necessary to achieve the statutory goals. He concluded that the
private interest involved-the individual's liberty-is "of the first or-
der,"263 with a correspondingly great harm resulting from an errone-
ous determination. Noting the imprecise nature of diagnoses of
medical disorders, the "great risk" of an erroneous deprivation of lib-
erty weighed heavily in favor of extensive procedural safeguards.264
Justice Bistline emphasized the fundamental precept of due pro-
cess that, if possible, the proper procedures be accorded prior to depri-
vation of the protected interest. He noted that the required showing
for recommitment is identical for the original commitment, which
must be preceded by a hearing. In his view, the majority improperly
placed the burden upon the patient to show that a pre-deprivation
hearing is required. He considered a hearing in the first instance nec-
essary to determine whether the facts asserted are true.
It would be wrong, and in many cases tragic, to assume that all reports of
"relapses" are either accurate or necessarily justify immediate rehospitaliza-
tion. As the court noted in C. v. Adams, supra, "[i]f the patient is refusing
treatment, which usually means missing appointments, the treating psycholo-
gist informs the mental health referee, who has the authority to issue an order
for the patient's return to the hospital." The fact that a patient misses an
appointment during out-patient treatment does not necessarily indicate a dan-
ger to the community or to the individual. On the other hand, the harm suf-
fered by unnecessary reinstitutionalization cannot be cured by a post-
deprivation hearing. The possibility of simple error in the factual basis for a
reported relapse gives rise to the spectre of the conditionally released patient
being plucked up by the state from his or her home or place of work, with no
prior notice, and returned to an institution, even in those instances in which
the patient has indeed in all respects followed the conditions of the release
program. This cannot be tolerated.2 6 5
Further, according to Justice Bistline, the medical nature of the
inquiry does not justify dispensing with the requirements of due pro-
cess. "It is precisely 'the subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagno-
ses' that justify the requirement of adversary hearings."266
261. Id. at 163, 645 P.2d at 903.
262. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
263. In re True, 103 Idaho 151, 164, 645 P.2d 891, 904 (1982).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 165, 645 P.2d at 905. (Bistline, J., concurring)(emphasis added)(citations
omitted).
266. Id. at 166, 645 P.2d at 906 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)).
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Consequently, Justice Bistline would have held that the Due Process
Clauses of the United States and Idaho Constitutions require that con-
ditionally released mental patients, except in emergency situations,
receive procedural safeguards prior to reinstitutionalization, including
(1) written notice; (2) an in-community hearing to determine whether
recommitment is necessary; (3) an opportunity to present evidence
and testimony and to cross-examine adverse witnesses; and (4) legal
counsel.
In addition to applying constitutional standards to commitment
and revocation procedures, judicial interpretation of state statutes is
often necessary. Observing that the distinctions between parole or
probation and outpatient therapy justify different procedural safe-
guards, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded in In Re
Richardson267 that a hearing prior to brief rehospitalization is not re-
quired by the District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill
Act. However, the court determined the Act required more stringent
safeguards than the order of the trial court provided.
Richardson involved three consolidated appeals from inpatient
commitment orders. Mr. Cade and Mr. Richardson were admitted to
St. Elizabeth Hospital as emergency patients. The Commission on
Mental Health conducted hearings after the hospital instituted civil
commitment proceedings. The Commission noted that Cade had been
admitted on six previous occasions; his condition improved with medi-
cation, but he had failed to comply with his treatment program and
had been without medication for several weeks. He was presently ex-
periencing hallucinations and paranoid delusions. In Richardson's
case, the Commission observed that he had recently signed himself out
of the hospital against medical advice, and "eloped" from the institu-
tion numerous times in the past.2 68 The Commission noted that with-
out medication and appropriate treatment Richardson's condition
would deteriorate, but he had been hostile about taking his medica-
tion. The Commission concluded that the conditions of both men had
been sufficiently stabilized to permit their return to the community,
provided that each take his medication and abide by his treatment
regimen.
The trial court entered final orders committing both men to outpa-
tient treatment programs. Pursuant to the hospital's request, the
court incorporated into both outpatient commitment orders a provi-
sion authorizing the hospital to return the patient summarily to the
institution for no more than five days in the event his condition deteri-
orated or he failed to comply with therapy. The orders provided fur-
ther that, beyond the five-day period, the hospital must either petition
267. 481 A.2d 473 (D.C. 1984).
268. Id. at 477.
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the court for an indeterminate commitment or return the individual
to the outpatient program. Cade and Richardson appealed from the
final orders.
Mr. Ellerbee was also admitted to the hospital as an emergency
patient. The Commission noted that he had been admitted on five pre-
vious occasions, and had failed in the past to take his medication or
comply with outpatient therapy. The Commission recommended hos-
pitalization until placement in a supervised residential facility could
be arranged. The court issued the order of commitment, but refused
to include a provision authorizing temporary return to inpatient care
in the event of deterioration or noncompliance.
The court set out procedures for cases in which the hospital deter-
mines a patient is likely to injure himself or others as a result of
mental illness unless immediately rehospitalized. The court required
an affidavit to be filed with the court, setting forth sufficient informa-
tion to justify the proposed temporary detention. The court would
then determine within twenty-four hours whether the patient should
be returned to the hospital for a period up to five days.269 If the hospi-
tal could not demonstrate the need for emergency rehospitalization,
the patient would not be returned to inpatient care, even for a tempo-
rary period, until the court determined after a hearing that detention
was justified. The hospital -appealed from the order committing El-
lerbee to outpatient treatment, asserting the trial court erred in re-
quiring judicial review prior to temporary return to inpatient care.
The appellate court considered the narrow issue of whether a com-
mitment order may authorize summary return to the hospital for a
brief period of reevaluation and treatment in the event a patient's con-
dition deteriorates or he fails to comply with the terms of the outpa-
tient treatment plan. The court recognized that "[n]ot every instance
of the outpatient's failure to take prescribed medication or attend
therapy sessions justifies the conclusion that he is not cooperating
with the treatment program." 270 However, the court noted:
[W]ithout the steadying influence of medication and other features of the out-
patient program, certain patients may become violent or return to the habits
and misperceptions that led to their original commitment.... Therefore, the
Hospital must be accorded some measure of flexibility in determining when a
particular patient is in need of institutional care.2 7 1
The court emphasized that a summary return provision should be in-
cluded in a commitment order only when, in light of the patient's con-
dition and medical history, such a provision appears warranted.
Noting that each of the patients had been committed to outpatient
269. After five days, the hospital must either release the individual or move for a
prompt adversary judicial hearing seeking revocation of outpatient status. See id.
at 481.
270. Id. at 479 n.5.
271. Id. (citation omitted).
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treatment programs in the past and had experienced difficulty in ad-
justing to life in the community or the requirements of the program,
the court found ample support in the record for inclusion in the com-
mitment order of provisions authorizing prompt reevaluations.
Rehospitalization was viewed as part of the treatment process, rather
than as an isolated event.
The court also recognized that "the Hospital staff, or those upon
whose information they rely, may err in concluding that the outpa-
tient has violated a condition of his release or has become increasingly
disoriented."272 In order to assure the trial court an opportunity to
determine whether temporary rehospitalization is appropriate, the
court concluded that the superintendent of the hospital must provide
the court with an affidavit, reciting recent actions of the patient and
reasons for his return, within twenty-four hours of the patient's re-
turn. The affidavit would enable the court to make an ex parte deter-
ruination that the patient has failed to follow the outpatient treatment
program or that his condition has deteriorated and temporary deter-
mination is justified. The court concluded these procedures ade-
quately guard against the erroneous deprivation of the outpatient's
conditional release and satisfy due process.2 7 3 However, the court
found no need for a second civil commitment proceeding since "the
sole question to be decided on a return is whether institutional care is
now appropriate, not whether the patient is mentally ill and likely to
injure himself or others." 274
Similar procedures were adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court
in In re Peterson.275 When Ms. Peterson was conditionally released
from hospitalization for a psychiatric disorder, she was required to
continue prescribed medication and keep scheduled outpatient ap-
272. Id. at 480. The court further noted that "[t]he prospect of error is somewhat en-
hanced by the possibility that in certain instances, the friends or relatives of an
outpatient may seek his return to the institution because they feel uncomfortable
in his presence or are dissatisfied with the progress he is making ... " Id.
273. The hospital may detain a patient for a maximum of five days without a full judi-
cial hearing. Thus, the possible length of wrongful deprivation of liberty would
be minimal. The affidavit procedure outlined in In re Richardson was recently
enforced in In re Feenster, 561 A.2d 997 (D.C. 1989). Four days after a committed
outpatient requested voluntary admission to the hospital, the hospital filed a peti-
tion to revoke the outpatient commitment order. The notice of rehospitalization
was not filed for another six days due to administrative error. The outpatient
commitment was subsequently revoked, and indefinite hospitalization ordered.
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia concluded that the involun-
tary detention for ten days before the hospital submitted the affidavit violated
the outpatient's rights under the Act; thus, the revocation of the outpatient com-
mitment order was rendered invalid by the illegal detention.
274. In re Richardson, 481, A.2d 473,481 n.8 (D.C. 1984). But see In re Stokes, 546 A-2d
356, 363 (D.C. 1988)("New findings of mental illness and dangerousness must be
made at the revocation hearing.").
275. 360 N.W.2d 333 (Minn. 1984).
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pointments. Shortly following the plaintiff's provisional discharge,
she was hospitalized after behaving "bizarrely."276 The court ordered
revocation of the provisional discharge and the patient's return to the
hospital without notice to her attorney. Minnesota statutes define
procedures for revocations more than sixty days after discharge,277 but
are inapplicable to revocations during the sixty-day period.278
The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded the statute did not vest
the head of the treatment facility with absolute and final discretion to
revoke a provisional discharge within the sixty-day period; the deci-
sion must be subject to some form of review. The court concluded that
brief rehospitalization without a prior adversarial hearing is author-
ized when the head of the facility provides the court, within forty-
eight hours of rehospitalization, with an affidavit reciting the recent
actions of the patient and reasons for her return. The patient and her
counsel must be provided with a copy of the affidavit. The patient
may challenge the basis for the decision by filing an affidavit specify-
ing her reasons for contesting. The court must then make the thresh-
old determination of whether a genuine issue exists concerning the
propriety of the revocation. Proceedings must be completed within
five days of the rehospitalization. Because the plaintiff provided no
evidence showing the information relied upon in support of her revo-
cation was either false or misinterpreted, the court affirmed the trial
court's order denying the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the revocation.
Alabama's revocation procedures were declared unconstitutional
in Birl v. Wallis.279 Plaintiff Birl had been involuntarily committed
to a state mental institution and then released on a "trial visit '280 after
276. Id. at 335.
277. Under MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.15(2)-(5)(West 1982 & Supp. 1990), the head of a
facility is authorized to revoke a provisional discharge if-
(i) The patient has violated material conditions of the provisional dis-
charge, and the violation creates the need to return the patient to the
facility, or
(ii) There exists a serious likelihood that the safety of the patient or
others will be jeopardized, in that either the patient's need[s] for food,
clothing, shelter, or medical care are not being met, or will not be met in
the near future, or the patient has attempted or threatened to seriously
physically harm himself or others.
278. Minnesota statutes provided that "[during the first 60 days of a provisional dis-
charge, the head of the treatment facility, upon finding that either of the condi-
tions set forth in subdivision 2 exists, may revoke the provisional discharge
without being subject to the provisions of subdivisions 2 to 5." Id. § 253B.15(6).
279. 619 F. Supp. 481 (M.D. Ala. 1985).
280. Under the trial visit program, the patient was released with instructions to con-
tinue with previously prescribed medication and therapy. Arrangements were
made for a community mental health center to provide continuity of care based
on a treatment plan. Patients were informed in writing of the conditions of the
trial visit prior to release. The goals of the trial visit program included helping
the individual maintain stability, participate in follow-up treatment, and adjust to
life in the community.
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a successful "temporary visit" with his mother for fourteen days.28l
Alabama Department of Mental Health policy allowed the return of
an individual within six months of release without a new commitment
hearing. After six months without return, the individual was consid-
ered unconditionally discharged. Community mental health centers
could recommend a patient's return to the hospital, but the readmis-
sion decision was made by a hospital psychiatrist. The court found
that hospital personnel sometimes attempted to verify reasons given
for an individual's return but were not required to do so.
Mr. Birl had suffered from a mental disorder for at least seven
years and had been hospitalized at least ten times. He also frequently
received treatment outside the hospital. Birl's trial visit was unevent-
ful for almost three months; however, after he stopped taking medica-
tion on the advice of a local physician, he began to exhibit symptoms
of disorder. After a visit to the mental health center, a recommenda-
tion for rehospitalization was entered and Birl was picked up at home
by a police officer and returned to the hospital involuntarily. Birl was
not given a reasonable opportunity to challenge the decision, either
before he was reconfined or within a reasonable time thereafter. He
received notice of the reasons for his reconfinement only when he spe-
cifically requested the information after his return. On his next trial
visit, Birl filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
enforcement of the procedures for reconfining patients released on
trial visits.
Using the Morrissey comparison, the court found similar character-
istics of parole and trial visits:
First, both constitute a conditional release intended to permit the parolee or
patient to demonstrate that he can function in society. '"he parolee has been
released from prison based on an evaluation that he shows reasonable promise
of being able to return to society and function as a responsible, self-reliant
person," [Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600.] Simi-
larly, the trial visit is a "test of... ability to cope," according to Bryce Hospi-
tal's manual. Furthermore, both the parolee and the mental patient on trial
visit enjoy considerable liberty.2 8 2
In light of the similarities between parole and trial visits, the court
concluded Morrissey applied.
The court rejected the argument that no state action was involved
because the mental health center which recommended rehospitaliza-
tion was a private facility. Because the decision to readmit was made
by a state hospital psychiatrist, and because the state's Department of
Mental Health contracted with the community mental health centers,
the court found the centers sufficiently involved with the state to be
281. Hospital policy granted temporary releases for a predetermined period of time,
up to fourteen days, for therapeutic or recreational purposes. Temporary visit
policies were not challenged by the plaintiff.
282. Id. at 490 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
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considered state actors; thus, the fourteenth amendment applied and
basic due process protections were required for the deprivation of
liberty.
The court noted that, under the existing procedures, a patient re-
leased on a trial visit could be reconfined on the basis of an uncon-
firmed report by an unnamed person or because someone in a
community mental health center disagreed with the diagnosis of the
hospital psychiatrist who recommended the trial visit. The outpatient
had no assurance that the decision to reconfine him would be made by
someone reliable who knew him well and had frequent contact with
him. The court concluded that, under the Matthews v. Eldridge bal-
ancing test, revocation presents a high risk of erroneous deprivation of
liberty, and the outpatient has a private interest in avoiding unex-
plained or unnecessary reconfinements. Further, the government's
interest in reconfining a patient who has not committed any crime
"and in fact may be guilty of nothing more than unusual or bizarre
behavior... is relatively weak."283 Thus, due process requires that
mental patients be given certain basic procedural safeguards before
they are returned from trial visits. However, the court also recognized
a possible private interest in assuring that prompt medical attention is
available for recurring mental disorders. The court did not forbid
rehospitalization, but found the record insufficient to determine what
specific procedures are required. Stating that the task of identifying
the proper procedures for reconfinement belongs primarily to the
state, the court allowed the defendants an opportunity to submit a
proposal.
The only subsequent major change made by the Department of
Mental Health required an order from a probate judge before recon-
finement would be permitted. The court found the changes insuffi-
cient because no guidelines were provided for a probate judge to
determine whether reconfinement was warranted. 28 4 The court noted
that initial involuntary civil commitment requires notice, a hearing
before a probate judge, the right to appear at the hearing, and the
right to be represented by appointed counsel. Under the procedures
and standards set forth in Lynch v. Baxey,285 and codified in the Ala-
bama Code, an individual may be committed only if the probate judge
finds the individual meets five criteria: 1) he is mentally ill; 2) as a
consequence of mental illness, he poses a real and present threat of
substantial harm to himself or others; 3) evidenced by a recent overt
act; 4) treatment is available or confinement necessary to prevent sub-
stantial harm to the individual or others; and 5) commitment is the
283. Id. at 492.
284. 633 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
285. 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. AL. 1974)(three-judge court).
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least restrictive alternative necessary and available.28 6
The court noted that the trial visit program is offered only to pa-
tients whose conditions have stabilized sufficiently and for whom hos-
pitalization is no longer necessary, when a clinical determination has
been reached that the patient can exist outside of the institution. In
other words, the patient no longer meets the requirements for invol-
untary commitment. The court found that, at the time of Birl's re-
lease on trial visit, his condition was essentially the same as
individuals who have been completely discharged and who could not
be committed involuntarily; the only remaining question was
"whether his condition would deteriorate to the point that confine-
ment would once again be warranted."28 7 The policy premise that the
initial commitment provides a sufficient basis for renewed confine-
ment, i-e., that new commitment procedures are not required because
the individual has already been found to be in need of hospitalization,
was considered by the court to be flawed.m8
Citing decisions by the Supreme Court and circuit courts,28 9 the
court concluded that continued confinement is constitutionally unjus-
tifiable when an individual is no longer dangerous. When a patient
has recovered to the point that his condition no longer satisfies the
requirements for an initial commitment and he no longer presents a
danger, he must be released-unconditionally. Because the decision to
release a patient on a trial visit signifies the patient has been found
nondangerous and in remission, the court would not allow a presump-
tion of continuing mental illness during the trial visit to justify the
rehospitalization procedures.
The court also rejected the argument that the hospital should be
free to reconfine a newly released patient at the first sign of trouble so
as to prevent either further deterioration in the patient's condition or
possible danger to others:
An individual may not be involuntarily hospitalized as an initial matter based
on a mere expectation of dangerousness, and there appears to be no reason
why a return from trial visit based on mere expectations is any more permissi-
ble.... Certainly the hospital could not pick up and reconfine a fully dis-
charged patient without going through initial commitment proceedings once
286. ALA. CODE § 22-52-10(a)(1984).
287. Birl v. Wallis, 633 F. Supp. 707, 710 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
288. Cf. In re Stokes, 546 A.2d 356 (D.C. 1988)(court has continuing responsibility to
identify the least restrictive alternative for a patient when a revocation of outpa-
tient commitment is sought by the hospital); In re James, 507 A.2d 155 (D.C.
1986)(trial court must make an explicit finding that inpatient treatment is the
least restrictive alternative before revoking a patient's outpatient commitment).
289. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)("even if [a mental patient's] in-
voluntary confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally con-
tinue after that basis no longer existed"); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426
(1979) ("the State has no interest in confining individuals involuntarily if they are
not mentally ill or if they do not pose some danger to themselves or others").
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again; nor may it do so with a patient released on trial visit.2 9 0
The court held that return from a trial visit is equivalent to an initial
commitment and requires the same procedures established in Lynch v.
BaxLey for initial commitments.
C. Analysis
The view that dangerous patients require inpatient treatment and
nondangerous patients should be released has been found among
judges and community mental health center clinicians.2 91 However,
since deinstitutionalization moved treatment from the hospital to the
community, many mentally ill persons who meet the criteria for invol-
untary treatment do not require inpatient hospitalization.292 In fact,
the dichotomy of treatment in a public institution or no treatment at
all is a major flaw in most states' mental health delivery systems. 293
Under statutes which require involuntary treatment in the least re-
strictive alternative, a mentally ill subject who is found to meet the
criteria for involuntary treatment must be committed to the appropri-
ate294 or available 295 treatment which is least restrictive of her liberty.
For some persons, hospitalization may be the least restrictive setting
for a period of time. Others may require structured living arrange-
ments, while still others need only outpatient treatment and supervi-
sion. Voluntary treatment is preferable to coerced intervention, but as
long as society sees fit to involuntarily treat mentally ill persons,296
treatments which are the least restrictive of individual liberties are
also desirable.
If persons who meet the standards for involuntary treatment are
committed to an alternative setting, can they be hospitalized when
290. Bin v. Wallis, 633 F. Supp. 707, 711 (M.D. ALa 1986)(citations onnitted). See
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
291. See id.; Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 23, at 149.
292. See Bachrach, supra note 2, at 6 (deinstitutionalization involves both depopula-
tion of state mental hospitals and diversion of potential admissions to community-
based facilities); Bachrach, supra note 25, at 1452.
293. See Bleicher, Compulsory Community Care for the Mentally 1l, 16 CLEV.-MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 93 (1967)(dichotomy of hospitalization or release deprives some
individuals of their liberty in the attempt to provide treatment, and deprives
others of treatment in order to safeguard liberty interests); Myers, Involuntary
Civil Commitment of the Mentally 11L" A System in Need of Change, 29 VILL. L.
REV. 367, 409 (1983-84)(dichotomous system offers total freedom or total
institutionalization).
294. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-11.C (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-21 (1989);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 5-405.B. (West Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 7618(a)(1987).
295. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.755(b)(1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.C (Supp.
1989); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5010(2)(1983).
296. Cf. Morse, supra note 20, at 57 ("involuntary commitment is a gravely unwise
social institution, regardless of its constitutionality"); Szasz, supra note 1.
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necessary because they have already been found dangerous? Are
these patients less "dangerous" than patients who require inpatient
treatment? They are, for practical purposes, in a situation similar to
patients who are conditionally released-their liberty is conditioned
upon not requiring inpatient hospitalization. The degree of freedom
they enjoy is greater in the community than in an institution,297 but
their freedom is not complete. Transfer to a more restrictive setting
when the patient's condition changes effects a deprivation of liberty
and also requires due process. 29s
Conditional release and outpatient commitment statutes which
provide for summary revocation of outpatient treatment by the releas-
ing facility or upon ex parte judicial order may violate the outpatient's
due process rights. Many states' statutes may thus be unconstitutional
under guidelines set forth in cases such as Meisel v. Kremmens, In re
True, and Birl v. Wallis.299 Clearly, an outpatient treatment statute
should provide procedural safeguards. The medical nature of the deci-
sion whether the outpatient requires immediate hospitalization--i.e.,
in an emergency-suggests that an in-community probable cause hear-
ing before a neutral hearing officer, such as that required by Morris-
sey v. Brewer for parole revocations, is inappropriate.3 00
In the absence of an emergency, however, a hearing could be ar-
ranged in a hospital, community mental health center, the outpatient's
home, or some other place convenient to the court or board and the
outpatient.301 When rehospitalization requires transporting the out-
patient to another town or city, the disruption of the outpatient's life
warrants providing a hearing prior to rehospitalization. However, the
purpose of the hearing should not simply be a determination of
whether the outpatient has failed to comply with the outpatient treat-
ment plan. Statutes which allow revocation of outpatient treatment
upon a finding of mere noncompliance or noncompliance "without
good cause" are punitive in nature.3 0 2 Hospitalization should not be
297. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
298. Id.; Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1977)(hearing required to
transfer involuntarily committed patient to a more restrictive hospital).
299. See Note, Constitutional Law: The Summary Revocation of an Involuntary
Mental Patient's Convalescent Leave-Is it Unconstitutional?, 33 OKLA. L. REV.
366, 368 n.12 (1980)(author suggests that the statutes of thirty-one states, as writ-
ten at that time, may violate due process).
300. Some states include preliminary probable cause hearings as part of the involun-
tary commitment process, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.07(7)(West 1982 & Supp.
1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.240 (1975 & Supp. 1990), but such provisions
are not likely to apply to emergencies.
301. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-60.5(d)(1985)("Hearings may be held at any conve-
nient place within the circuit"); Op. REV. STAT. § 426.095(1)(1989)(a commitment
hearing may be held "in a hospital, the person's home or in some other place
convenient to the court and the allegedly mentally ill person").
302. See e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.15(2)(West 1985)("If at any time the patient with-
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used as a punishment for mentally ill persons who fail or refuse to
comply with treatment,3 0 3 nor should preventive detention be used in
anticipation of future dangerousness. 04 The noncompliance with out-
patient treatment must result in a deterioration of the patient's condi-
tion and a need for inpatient treatment before revocation is
justifiable.3 05 Mentally ill persons who are "gravely disabled" should
be provided the necessary assistance and services-in addition to
support of family and social service agencies-through the use of
volunteers,3 06 limited guardianships, 07 and structured living arrange-
out good cause fails or refuses to submit to treatment as ordered by the court,...
[the court] shall order the patient hospitalized... unless the court finds that the
failure or refusal was with good cause and that the patient is willing to receive
treatment...."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 27A-9-28 (1984)("If the individual
ordered to undergo a program of treatment does not comply with the order, the
board of mental illness shall conduct a hearing for the sole purpose of determin-
ing compliance or noncompliance, and if noncompliance is determined, the board
may modify its original order and direct the individual to undergo an alternative
program of treatment."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-12-242(3)(a)(1989)(court shall
find whether "the patient has failed to comply with a specified treatment plan to
which the patient had agreed in writing").
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has rejected the notion that
a presumption of mental illness and dangerousness established by the original
commitment allows a court to revoke an outpatient commitment when a patient
fails to comply with the outpatient treatment plan:
A revocation of outpatient commitment based solely upon a patient's
failure to comply with the prescribed course of outpatient treatment,
without reliable evidence in the record that the patient is likely to be
dangerous as a result of her mental illness, would violate the [District of
Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally l] Act. Further,... revoca-
tion of [James'] outpatient commitment would be impermissibly punitive
in the absence of a finding that inpatient commitment was the least re-
strictive alternative.
In re James, 507 A.2d 155,158 (D.C. 1986)(citations omitted). Accord In re Stokes,
546 A-2d 356, 363 (D.C. 1988).
303. Although therapeutic care might be possible in a hospital milieu, in practice,
large public institutions are often inadequately funded and poorly staffed and res-
idents are allowed little freedom of choice in the decisions of daily life.
304. See People v. Nunn, 108 ll. App. 3d 169, 173, 438 N.E.2d 1342, 1344 (1982)(stan-
dard which requires the state to prove by clear and convincing evidence that an
individual is in need of hospitalization is not satisfied where the individual might
fail to take prescribed medication and present a danger to himself or others).
305. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.15(2)(West 1982 & Supp. 1990). See supra text ac-
companying note 277. See also In re Stokes, 546 A.2d 356, 363 (D.C. 1988)(outpa-
tient's failure to take her medication is not, in and of itself, a basis for revocation
of outpatient status); People v. Nunn, 108 Ill. App. 3d 169, 173, 438 N.E.2d 1342,
1344 (1982)(the refusal to take medication is not sufficient to justify an order of
commitment).
306. Katkin, Zimmerman, Rosenthal & Ginsburg, Using Volunteer Therapists to Re-
duce Hospital Readmissions, 26 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 151 (1975).
307. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.H (1986 & Supp. 1989)("If upon finding that a
patient is gravely disabled, the court also finds that the patient is in need of im-
mediate guardianship for the purpose of protection of the patient or for the pur-
pose of carrying out alternatives to court-ordered treatment, the court may
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ments 308 to allow them to live in the community.
Some states have elaborate procedures for revocation of condi-
tional releases from inpatient treatment. For example, in Tennessee,
"the parent, guardian, spouse, responsible adult relative, or treating
professional of a patient, the person who initiated the commitment
proceedings of the patient, or the head of the discharging facility" may
file an affidavit with the appropriate court if an outpatient is, "without
good cause," not complying with the treatment plan and the treating
professional believes the outpatient will not comply voluntarily.309 If
the affidavit was filed by the treating professional and the outpatient
does not appear before the court, the sheriff transports the patient to
the releasing facility, where the patient is temporarily recommitted31o
If the affidavit was filed by someone other than the treating profes-
sional and the patient does not appear before the court, the patient is
taken to the treating professional or a community mental health
center for examination. If the professional finds the outpatient is not
complying, without good cause, and is not likely to comply, the outpa-
tient is returned to the releasing facility under a temporary recommit-
ment and a hearing is scheduled.311 If the outpatient appears before
the court, a hearing is held to determine whether the outpatient is,
without good cause, not complying with the treatment. If the court
finds the outpatient either cannot be put in compliance immediately
or will not stay in compliance without hospitalization, the patient is
recommitted to the releasing facility.3 12 If an outpatient is rehospital-
ized for noncompliance after a hearing, "upon readmission the patient
shall be held under the authority of the original court order of com-
mitment."3 1 3 Because no finding of present dangerousness is made
and the initial commitment is relied upon for authority to rehospital-
ize, Tennessee's statute appears directly contrary to Birl v. Walli.314
appoint a temporary guardian .. "). Use of representative payees or adult pro-
tective services would allow assistance to be limited to specific functions in ac-
cordance with individual needs.
308. In most communities, there exists a need for a range of residential services, such
as group homes and intermediate care facilites which can allow residents as much
freedom as each is capable of handling, and can provide structure and supervision
according to individual needs.
309. TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-202(1)(1984 & Supp. 1989).
310. Id. at § 33-6-204(a)(Supp. 1989).
311. Id. at § 33-6-204 (Supp. 1989).
312. Id. at § 33-6-203(d)(Supp. 1989).
313. Id. at § 33-6-206 (Supp. 1989).
314. See also, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.15(1)(West 1982 & Supp. 1990)('The head
of the treatment facility may provisionally discharge any patient without dis-
charging the commitment, unless the patient was found.., mentally ill and dan-
gerous to the public."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-12-241(2)(a)(1989)(The clinical
director of the mental health facility "is authorized to issue an order for the im-
mediate placement of a patient not previously released from an order of hospitali-
zation into a more restrictive environment . . ."); W. VA. CODE § 27-7-4
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States cannot "define away" the problem by conferring authority to
rehospitalize patients under an original commitment order if that au-
thority cannot constitutionally be granted.
The Birl court's view that automatic rehospitalization of condition-
ally released patients is unjustifiable because they no longer meet the
commitment criteria may be correct insofar as many conditional re-
lease statutes allow involuntary3lS rehospitalization after long periods
of time316 without a full hearing and in the discretion of mental health
professionals.31 7 Conditional release into the community from inpa-
tient treatment is hardly a "trial visit" after several months without
incident. As the court in Birl required, a patient who is no longer dan-
gerous must be unconditionally released.31 8
However, mental health professionals may not always know
whether a patient who appears stable in a structured environment will
adjust to community life-the individual is often returned to circum-
stances which may have precipitated the onset of an acute episode. In
Oklahoma, for example, convalescent leave is granted rather than dis-
charge when "the patient's complete recovery can be determined only
by permitting him to leave the facility."3 19 Thus, hospital profession-
als should be allowed some discretion in granting trial visits for sev-
eral days and conditional releases for limited periods of time.3 20 At
(1986)(involuntary patients on convalescent leave "may be readmitted to the
mental health facility on the basis of the original commitment").
315. Of course, patients who recognize the need for hospitalization and voluntarily
seek treatment should be permitted readmission.
316. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.469(3)(West 1986)(one year). ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 911/
2, para. 4-702(b)(Smith-Hurd 1987)(conditional discharge for one year;, can be ex-
tended one year); IOWA CODE ANN. § 226.23 (West 1985)(convalescent leave up to
one year); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2924(d)(1983 & Supp. 1989)(indeterminate);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1479 (1980 & Supp. 1988)(director shall discharge
any patient who has been on authorized leave or absence from the hospital for a
continuous period of one year); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.15(1)(West 1982 & Supp.
1990) (provisional discharge shall terminate on the date specified in the aftercare
plan unless revoked or extended); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 7-101(B)(West
Supp. 1990)(patient who has not been returned to releasing facility within twelve
months of granting of convalescent leave is discharged).
317. See supra notes 73-74.
318. See also Note, supra note 299, at 382:
[I]f the state hospital director believed that the patient was well enough
to leave the hospital without endangering himself or others, and the pa-
tient has not been rehospitalized while on leave, then logically it can be
assumed that treatment has been successful. The patient has proved
that he is no longer dangerous and can live in society. Thus, even though
the patient may continue to be mentally ill, he no longer meets the statu-
tory requirements for commitment.
319. OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 7-101 (West Supp. 1990).
320. See IMDL SuPPLmN', supra note 16, Guideline H.3(b)("If, at any time during a
period of court-ordered commitment to an inpatient or outpatient mental health
facility, a respondent's condition improves but the respondent remains in need of
involuntary mental health services less restrictive than those provided by the fa-
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the end of the period of conditional release, a patient who did not re-
quire inpatient treatment would be unconditionally discharged and
rehospitalization would require a new commitment order. Outpatient
commitment proceedings could be initiated if the individual would
likely benefit from continued treatment and meet the criteria for out-
patient commitment.32 '
IV. CRITERIA FOR INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
A. The Dangerousness Standard
In 1961, Lindman and McIntyre considered the issue of hospitaliza-
tion of nondangerous mentally ill persons to prevent their condition
from deteriorating, particulary patients such as manic depressives and
schizophrenics who could become dangerous without treatment:
Although it may be desirable from a medical point of view to hospitalize those
who are not presently dangerous but who might easily become so in the ab-
sence of proper treatment, the question of the propriety of such hospitaliza-
tion remains a real one in view of the conditions existing in many hospitals. A
prime requisite for the success of such a policy is that the hospitals are
equipped to offer the care and treatment required by such patients. Many
communities have not yet provided the financial resources essential to the es-
tablishment and maintenance of such facilities. In the absence of such facili-
ties, of course, there is no justification for broadening the involuntary
hospitalization requirements to include nondangerous persons.3 2 2
Nearly fifteen years later, the United States Supreme court held in
O'Connor v. Donaldson that "a State cannot constitutionally confine
without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving
safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsi-
ble family members or friends."323 Although this ambiguous holding
may be taken to mean that a state cannot confine a nondangerous
mentally ill person unless adequate treatment is provided, many lower
courts interpreted Donaldson to mean that involuntary civil commit-
ment statutes which do not require proof of dangerousness as well as
mental illness are unconstitutional. 32 4 Accordingly, courts struck
cility, the [treatment professional] should effect a transfer to a less restrictive
facility or a conditional release .... which may include outpatient treatment and
care or a combination of outpatient and inpatient treatment and care"). In some
states, the conditional release terminates when the period of involuntary commit-
ment ends. Thus, if a patient is committed for a 90-day period and is hospitalized
for 60 days, he may be conditionally released for the remaining 30 days. See, e.g.,
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.385(2)(1988 & Supp. 1990).
321. See ikfra Section IV. B.
322. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 20 (F.T. Lindman & D.M. McIntyre ed.
1961).
323. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
324. See, e.g., Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980); Doe v. Gallinot, 486 F. Supp.
983 (C.D. Cal. 1979); Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F. Supp. 424 (D.
Utah 1979).
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down statutes which permitted commitment based solely on standards
of "in need of treatment" or "in the best interest of the patient."325
Statutory revisions resulted in adoption in most jurisdictions of a com-
mitment standard requiring dangerousness to others or dangerousness
to self, which may encompass inability to care for basic needs (gravely
disabled).326
Recently, some states, in a shift back to reliance on parens patriae
powers, have broadened their commitment criteria to allow involun-
tary treatment of mentally ill persons whose condition will deteriorate
without treatment.3 27 As treatment in settings less restrictive than
inpatient hospitalization becomes more widely available, the issue is
again raised of the propriety of involuntary commitment of mentally
ill persons who are not currently dangerous and who would not be
committable under police power standards.328
325. Se4 eg., Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1979); Goldy v. Beal, 429 F.
Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa
1976).
326. See supra note 5. State statutes, and judicial interpretations, vary in their defini-
tions of "dangerous". A number of states require evidence of a recent overt act
indicating dangerousness, ag., ALA. CODE § 22-52-10(a)(3)(1975); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43A, § 1-103(n)(1)(West Supp. 1990). Pennsylvania requires "clear and
present danger of harm to others" or the patient. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50,
§ 7301(a)(Purdon Supp. 1990). In addition to dangerousness to self or others,
many states allow involuntary commitment of mentally ill persons who are un-
able to provide for basic needs, ag., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902(g)(2)(Supp. 1989);
McCH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 330.1401(b)(West 1980); MNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 253B.02(13)(West 1982 & Supp. 1990)("failure to obtain necessary food, clothing,
shelter or medical care"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.005(9)(Vernon 1988 & Supp.
1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 1-103(n)(2)(West Supp. 1990), or who are
gravely disabled, e-g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(c)(1984); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-540(A)(1986 & Supp. 1989).
In Nebraska, a mentally ill dangerous person is defined as any mentally ill,
alcoholic, or drug abusing person who presents:
(1) A substantial risk of serious harm to another person or persons
within the near future as manifested by evidence of recent violent acts or
threats of violence or by placing others in reasonable fear of such harm;
or
(2) A substantial risk of serious harm to himself or herself within the
near future as manifested by evidence of recent attempts at, or threats
of, suicide or serious bodily harm or evidence of inability to provide for
his or her basic human needs, including food, clothing, shelter, essential
medical care, or personal safety.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1009 (1987).
327. See Durham & La Fond, supra note 31, at 399.
328. See id. at 401 (involuntary commitments in Washington increased significantly
and included many patients who had no previous contact with state hospitals af-
ter commitment law was broadened). Geller, supra note 11, at 1261, argues that
the Massachusetts involuntary commitment standard, which requires a "likeli-
hood of serious harm" is satisfied by mere discontinuation of medication by pa-
tients with a history of deterioration and dangerousness. However, unless
Massachusetts case law has interpreted the statutory definition of likelihood of
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B. A Lower Standard for Outpatient Commitment?
Most states which allow commitment to outpatient treatment as an
alternative disposition require the same standard as that required for
inpatient commitment. Thus, the committing agency first determines
whether an individual meets the statutory criteria for involuntary
commitment and then a treatment disposition is determined, much as
a finding of guilt precedes sentencing for criminal offenders. For ex-
ample, in Virginia, persons who meet the criteria for involuntary
treatment but who are not in need of hospitalization may be subject to
court-ordered outpatient treatment. 29
Under some statutes, after the initial finding of involuntary com-
mitment, specific criteria must be satisfied before outpatient treat-
ment may be ordered. In Arizona, if the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that a mentally ill person is a danger to himself or
others or is gravely disabled and in need of treatment and is either
unwilling or unable to accept voluntary treatment, the court may or-
der the person to undergo a program of outpatient treatment, inpa-
tient treatment, or a combination program of inpatient and outpatient
treatment.330 However, outpatient treatment or combined inpatient
and outpatient treatment may be ordered only if the court finds that
the patient: (a) does not require continuous inpatient hospitalization;
(b) will be more appropriately treated in an outpatient treatment pro-
gram (or combination program); (c) will follow a prescribed outpatient
treatment plan; and (d) will likely not become dangerous or suffer
more serious physical harm or serious illness if he follows a prescribed
serious harm very broadly, the discontinuation of medication alone does not ap-
pear sufficient. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 1 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990)
defines likelihood of serious harm as:
(1) a substantial risk of physical harm to the person himself as mani-
fested by evidence of, threats of, or attempts at, suicide or serious bodily
harm; (2) a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as mani-
fested by evidence of homicidal or other violent behavior or evidence
that others are placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious
physical harm to them; or (3) a very substantial risk of physical impair-
ment or injury to the person himself as manifested by evidence that such
person's judgment is so affected that he is unable to protect himself in
the community and that reasonable provision for his protection is not
available in the community.
(emphasis added). Broadening of statutory criteria to include anticipation of fu-
ture dangerousness should be clearly delineated by legislatures, not adopted by
practitioners. Dr. Geller does not disagree; at the end of his article he notes:
"without clear statutes governing community-based, coercive treatment, beth pa-
tients and practitioners may be vulnerable to idiosyncratic resolutions .... These
imposed therapeutic interventions will vary significantly across the continua of
legal rights, clinical efficacy, and basic respect for individuality." Geller, supra
note 11, at 1263.
329. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
330. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.A (1986 & Supp. 1989).
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outpatient treatment plan.3 3 ' In Michigan, an involuntarily commit-
ted person who "has been hospitalized involuntarily 2 or more times
within the 2-year period immediately preceding the filing of the peti-
tion" and who has rejected aftercare programs and treatment must be
ordered to undergo a program of combined hospitalization and alter-
native treatment.3 32
A few states which include a separate statutory scheme for invol-
untary outpatient commitment provide a lower standard for outpa-
tient commitment than is required for inpatient commitment. North
Carolina statutes define the criteria for outpatient commitment to re-
quire "clear, cogent and convincing" evidence of mental illness; capa-
bility of surviving safely in the community with available supervision
from family, friends or others;333 a treatment history indicating a need
for treatment to prevent further disability or deterioration which
"would predictably result in dangerousness"; and inability to make an
informed decision voluntarily to seek or comply with recommended
treatment.=
Similarly, in Hawaii, outpatient commitment may be ordered if the
family court finds that an individual is (1) suffering from a severe
mental disorder; (2) is capable of surviving safely in the community
with supervision; (3) "at some time in the past: (A) has received inpa-
tient hospital treatment for a severe mental disorder... or (B) has
been imminently dangerous to self or others as a result of a severe
mental disorder"; (4) based on treatment history and current behav-
ior, the person is now in need of treatment in order to prevent a re-
lapse or deterioration which would predictably result in the person's
becoming imminently dangerous; (5) the person is unable to make an
informed decision to seek or comply with recommended treatment;
and (6) there is a reasonable prospect that outpatient treatment will
be beneficial.3 35
Georgia also allows outpatient commitment of mentally ill persons
who do not meet the inpatient criteria. An "outpatient" is defined as a
person who is mentally ill and "is not an inpatient but who, based on
the person's treatment history or current mental status, will require
outpatient treatment in order to avoid predictably and imminently be-
coming an inpatient" and who, because of current mental status,
mental history, or nature of mental illness is unable to seek or comply
voluntarily with outpatient treatment and is in need of involuntary
331. Id. at § 36-540.B.
332. McH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 330.1468(4)(West Supp. 1990).
333. Note the similarity in language to the Supreme Court's holding in O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). See supra note 323 and accompany text.
334. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-271 (a)(1)(1989).
335. HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-121 (1985).
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treatment.33 6
A lower standard for outpatient commitment may allow early, or
continuing, treatment of discharged or never-hospitalized chronic pa-
tients and consequently may prevent decompensation or worsening of
the individual's condition. Services could be provided to patients who
otherwise would be left on their own without adequate resources or
support. However desirable aftercare services may be, the critical is-
sue is the stage at which coercive beneficence is justifiable.
In light of the imprecision of psychiatric diagnoses33 7 and improper
use of medications (as well as the history of institutional abuses of the
mentally handicapped), vague standards allowing professional judg-
ments about patients' "need" for treatment and "inability" to make
the "correct" decision to accept treatment may be eyed suspiciously. 33 8
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has, in recent years, granted
great deference to the professional judgment of qualified mental
health professionals.3 39 If the Supreme Court's holding in Donaldson
is read to mean that a state cannot constitutionally institutionalize a
nondangerous mentally ill person, then involuntary outpatient com-
mitment of currently nondangerous mentally ill persons, with lesser
restrictions on liberty, may be constitutionally permissible. Birl v.
Wallis is not contrary to this view; the court in Birl objected to the
rehospitalization of outpatients without a due process determination
of the dangerousness required for confinement.
Thus, if hospitalization upon noncompliance is not permitted, a
lower standard for outpatient commitment may be acceptable for the
class of individuals who have a long history of chronic mental illness
and of failure to comply with aftercare treatment after being stabi-
lized and released from involuntary treatment or hospitalization.
Once dangerousness has been demonstrated and the state has exer-
cised its legitimate authority in committing the individual, continued
supervision by the state for a limited period of time340 on outpatient
status may be justified if a high likelihood exists of a return to a "dan-
336. GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(12.1)(Cum. Supp. 1987).
337. See Morse, supra note 20, at 68-71.
338. See, e.g., United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 495-96 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Mor-
ris, Dr. Szasz or Dr. Seuss: Whose Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment, 9 J.
PsYCHIATRY & L. 283, 290 (1981)(deciding whether a patient is competent by de-
termining whether he agrees with the psychiatrist's proposed treatment under-
mines the concept of patient autonomy and abrogates the right to refuse
treatment)), vacated, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cr. 1988)(en banc), cert den., 110 S. Ct.
1317 (1990).
339. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
340. An outpatient commitment statute might allow involuntary outpatient treatment
for 60 days (e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ca 91 1/2, para. 3-813(a)(Smith-Hurd 1987)), 90
days (e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.770 (1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-
127(2)(b)(1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-271(a)(1989)), or six months (e.g., HAw.
REV. STAT. § 334-127 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 426.130(2)(1989)).
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gerous" condition without continuing treatment, even though the indi-
vidual is not currently dangerous or in need of hospitalization.
However, such statutes should require a history of involuntary treat-
ment and demonstrated dangerousness within the recent past, and not
a history of hospitalization.3 41 As treatment moves into the commu-
nity, newer chronic patients might never require hospitalization.
A different situation exists when the individual is being considered
for outpatient commitment, not after a long period of inpatient treat-
ment, but as a less restrictive alternative to inpatient treatment, as in
an initial commitment order. Arguably, early treatment of a first epi-
sode may allow the individual to remain in the community and thus
minirn e disruption of his life as well as avoid the labelling and stigma
often attached to institutionalization. However, there is a danger that
committing agencies will commit to outpatient treatment individuals
who do not meet the standard for inpatient treatment because they
believe the individual needs some treatment and the restrictions on
liberty occasioned by outpatient commitment are less onerous.34
Such practices would expand the reach of the state's commitment au-
thority to include individuals who have not previously been treated in
the state's mental health system.34 3 Such individuals might be willing
to seek treatment voluntarily at an early stage when they may be
more capable of recognizing the need. Thus, a lower standard for out-
patient commitment may be justified for the chronically mentally ill
but not for allegedly mentally ill persons who have never been proven
dangerous, by whatever interpretation of dangerousness used. For
nonchronic patients, commitment to outpatient treatment could still
be ordered as a less restrictive alternative to inpatient treatment for
persons who satisfy the standard commitment criteria of mentally ill
and dangerous.
341. See Mfinkoff, supra note 6, at 946 ("As deinstitutionalization has become more
'successful,' it has become increasingly the norm for people with chronic mental
illness to spend the major portion of their lives in the community and never to
become institutionalized in a state hospital"). Cf. Michigan's criteria, supra note
332 & accompanying text.
342. Cf. supra note 43.
343. See Durham & La Fond, supra note 31. Most outpatient commitment laws are
designed to reach chronic patients, see Hiday and Scheid-Cook, supra note 23, at
215-16, rather than widen the net to subject additional persons to involuntary
treatment. Early interventions should endeavor to keep nonchronic persons out
of the commitment system rather than seeking to draw them in. See CAPLAN,
supra note 8, at 105 ("In order to make a significant contribution to the reduction
of prevalence, treatment must be not only early but also successful." A patient is
more likely to respond to early treatment, before "the disorder has become but-
tressed by the patient's entire life situation and he has learned to profit from the
secondary gratifications and dispensations of the patient role").
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V. CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Involuntary outpatient treatment may be provided to mentally ill
persons pursuant to either conditional release or outpatient commit-
ment statutes. In general, conditional release procedures allow the di-
rector of an inpatient facility to release hospitalized mentally ill
persons to outpatient treatment on specified conditions. If the patient
fails to comply or adjust in the community, the release can be revoked
at the director's discretion. Such provisions have come under attack
for failure to provide outpatients due process by ensuring that the rev-
ocation is necessary.
Outpatient commitment is ordered by a court or mental health
board following a period of inpatient treatment or as a less restrictive
alternative to inpatient treatment. Procedural protections are usually
provided, although some states allow revocation upon mere noncom-
pliance, without requiring a showing of need for inpatient treatment.
Anticipation of predictable dangerousness of chronic mental patients
who have a history of decompensation and dangerousness when treat-
ment is discontinued may justify involuntary outpatient treatment,
but hospitalization requires a showing of present dangerousness.
Studies of the effectiveness of outpatient commitment indicate that
outpatient commitment can be successful in maintaining chronically
mentally ill individuals in the community.3 44 Outpatient commitment
has been shown to be effective in both increasing compliance with af-
tercare programs-even after the period of outpatient commitment
has ended 3 45--and reducing hospital readmission rates.3 46
One reason for the dearth of outpatient commitments in Nebraska
may be the failure of the Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act
to provide specific guidelines for outpatient commitment or for revo-
cation or modification of the outpatient treatment order if an outpa-
tient does not comply with treatment. Another reason might be a lack
of available treatment programs or community mental health center
therapists who are willing or able to provide active outreach and moni-
toring of clients.3 4 7
Judges and mental health professionals involved in the mental
health system often advocate strict provisions for enforcing outpatient
commitment orders and dealing with noncompliance by outpa-
tients.348 However, patients must be protected from the potential
344. See Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 163.
345. See Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra notes 23 & 163; Van Putten, Santiago & Berren,
Involuntary Outpatient Commitment in Arizona: A Retrospective Study, 39
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PsYCHmATRY 953 (1988).
346. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 163. But see Bursten, supra note 23.
347. Cf. Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 23.
348. See INVOLUNTARY OUT-PATIENT COMMITMENT, supra note 48; Hiday & Scheid-
Cook, supra note 23, at 218.
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abuses of allowing unchecked discretion3 49 or from being hospitalized
when their conditions do not warrant inpatient treatment. Likewise,
outpatient commitment should not be used simply as a mechanism for
forcible medication. Outpatient commitment may be most appropriate
for gravely disabled persons who need assistance in housing, money
management and independent living as well as mental health treat-
ment by providing a justification for involuntary intervention and
monitoring.
The chronically mentally ill outpatient should be committed to a
designated treatment facility and/or professsional, with a treatment
plan filed with the committing agency. Because the person is not com-
mitted to an inpatient facility, there is no hospital to which to "return"
the noncomplying outpatient. As in North Carolina and Hawaii, out-
reach efforts, including home visits when necessary, should be re-
quired to encourage compliance. Transportation should be arranged
for treatment appointments if necessary. Because many chronically
mentally ill persons are unable to support themselves, medications
should be readily available at minimal or no cost.3 50
If efforts to obtain compliance fail, the treating professional or di-
rector of the facility should petition the court or mental health board
for an order directing a peace officer to transport the outpatient to the
outpatient treatment facility for examination.3 51 In an emergency, the
outpatient could be hospitalized for a limited period of time, e.g.,
thirty-six hours, at the discretion of the designated outpatient treat-
ment professional or another qualified mental health professional,
with an affidavit describing the reasons for the hospitalization submit-
ted to the committing agency. The court could order continued deten-
tion of the patient pending a hearing only if the court finds that
hospitalization is necessary to avoid serious imminent harm to the pa-
tient or others. Otherwise, the patient would be returned to the com-
munity and revocation could be sought if continued inpatient
treatment was believed necessary.
If, upon examination, the professional determines that the outpa-
tient is not in need of immediate treatment, the professional should
349. See Mulvey, Geller & Roth, supra note 34, at 575 ('Then benevolent treatment
and coercion operate together, it seems that coercion becomes pervasive whereas
treatment remains nominal").
350. See CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 122-23.
351. See supra note 200 & accompanying text; Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 23, at
150-51:
Outpatient commitment statutes should contain provisions authorizing
the transportation of noncompliant patients directly to the facilities to
which they were committed, rather than back to inpatient facilities....
Rehospitalization interrupts the patient's community treatment unnec-
essarily and provides too convenient an escape valve for CMHC staff
who are reluctant to deal with involuntary patients.
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provide and encourage treatment, but should not forcibly medicate the
outpatient. The peace officer should then return the outpatient to the
community, and if the professional believes the outpatient is showing
signs of deterioration and refuses outpatient treatment, the profes-
sional may petition the committing agency for a hearing for revocation
or modification of the outpatient order.3 5 2 The outpatient would re-
main in the community and receive sufficient notice of the hearing.
His attorney and any other interested persons should also be notified.
By requiring "all reasonable efforts" to obtain compliance and not al-
lowing automatic hospitalization, not only will the outpatient's due
process rights be protected, but outpatient treatment providers will be
forced to make a commitment to treating the outpatient and will not
have available the alternative of simply returning difficult patients to
the hospital.
At the hearing, the burden of proof should be on the party seeking
revocation. The committing agency could revoke if it found a change
in the outpatient's condition (whether resulting from noncompliance
or not) such that she is imminently dangerous to herself or others and
requires more restrictive treatment. The court should periodically re-
view each outpatient's progress under the outpatient treatment plan
and be permitted to discharge patients who are not benefitting from
involuntary treatment. Voluntary outpatient treatment should be en-
couraged, with similar provision of transportation, medication, and
outreach efforts when necessary. Such efforts should perhaps be tried
before resorting to involuntary proceedings.
Conditional release from hospitalization could be allowed for a lim-
ited period of time, such as thirty days. The releasing facility should
file an outpatient treatment plan with the committing agency for re-
view prior to release. Any return of the patient to the institution dur-
ing the period of conditional release would require the facility to
notify the court or mental health board and the patient and his attor-
ney of the reasons for the rehospitalization within twenty-four hours.
If the committing agency finds the supporting basis insufficient, the
hospital may request a hearing or release the patient. If the commit-
ting agency approves the return and revokes the conditional release,
the patient would also have the right to request a hearing.
If outpatients cannot be forcibly medicated or automatically hospi-
talized, one may question the value of a separate procedure for outpa-
tient commitment. A judicial finding of a need for outpatient
commitment may provide a justification for the intrusiveness occa-
sioned by outreach efforts for an outpatient who knows he is required
352. The outpatient treatment order would be revoked if inpatient and outpatient pro-
cedures are separate, see supra note 82 and accompanying text. The order could
be modified to require inpatient treatment or other alternative treatment if out-
patient treatment was a dispositional alternative. See supra Section I.A.
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by court order to receive treatment. Some patients will be more likely
to comply with aftercare or outpatient treatment, either because of
the court order itself or because of the greater involvement of mental
health professionals. Monitoring of the patient's condition permits
early intervention upon deterioration, before the individual causes dis-
ruption or damage. Further, inpatient facilities may be more willing
to release some patients earlier if patients will continue to receive
treatment. Mulvey, Geller, and Roth suggest that outpatient commit-
ment is "worth attempting" because:
[Outpatient commitment] is a possible way to get us out of the present quan-
dary of having to decide between the inhumaneness of institutions and the
neglect involved in dumping mental patients in the community. The use of an
element of coercion should make us wary of the dangers of this approach, but
the unsuitability of our present options should push us to design a system that
is sensitive to both the needs and the rights of mental patients. 35 3
Disabled mentally ill persons who are not dangerous to themselves
or others should be provided the assistance they need to survive in the
community.354 Broadening the group of individuals who may be
treated against their will can have serious, often unintended, conse-
quences for a state's mental health system.35 5 Further, treatment is
generally available on a voluntary basis;3 56 although some persons, be-
cause of the nature of their illness, might refuse to seek help, society is
not thereby "denying" them treatment by not forcing it upon them.35 7
The solution to the problems of the homeless mentally ill is not to
send them back "home" to the institution. The "failure" of deinstitu-
tionalization may be attributed, not to ideological deficiencies, but to
implementation issues, inadequate funding and continued reliance on
institutional care.358 If the number of individuals involuntarily com-
mitted increases, alternatives to inpatient hospitalization will need to
be considered as facilities become overcrowded. The additional fund-
ing which would undoubtedly be needed under an approach suggesting
more treatment for more persons would be better spent in strengthen-
353. Mulvey, Geller & Roth, supra note 34, at 582.
354. See Mulvey, Geller & Roth, supra note 34, at 577 ("No therapeutic alliance or
empowerment is likely to occur in [a clearly monitoring] relationship. Efforts
would be better spent providing for the basic needs of these individuals and work-
ing toward positive relationships through pro-active outreach programs"). Cf.
Lewis & Hugi, supra note 31 at 216 (interviews with former patients indicated
that for some patients readmission may be purposeful behavior to obtain re-
sources such as housing, food and companionship which ex-patients often lack).
355. See Durham & La Fond, supra note 31.
356. But see id. at 401 (change in commitment law resulted in extreme overcrowding
in state hospitals such that voluntary patients were virtually excluded).
357. Cf. supra note 21 and accompanying text.
358. See Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill, Hearing Before the Subcommittee
on Fiscal Affairs and Health of the Home Committee on the District of Columbia,
97th Congress, 1st Session 155-67 (1981)(testimony of John Talbott, M.D., Profes-
sor of Psychiatry, Cornell University Medical College).
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ing community and residential services. If the Nebraska legislature is
determined to relax the criteria for involuntary civil commitment,
such efforts should be limited to reaching those individuals who are
not adequately served under the current approach. A lower standard
for outpatient commitment of the chronically mentally ill only would
be preferable to a lower standard for all involuntary commitments.
